In effect, Richard M. Hare proposes two different definitions of what he takes to be ‘entailment’ (sects. 1–2). If properly applied, both of them are promising indeed (sects. 3–5). At the same time, however, they capture on the one hand less andon the other hand more than ought to be expected of an entailment-relation (sects. 6–7). Moreover, either one fails to do justice to one or other formal criterion of adequacy to be postulated for a definition of entailment (sect. 8). The latter shortcoming can be overcome by merging Hare’s two definitions into one by way of stipulating a restriction of the domain on which to define the relation (sect. 9). Still, this relation is not yet entailment proper but a highly generic relation of ‘linguistic (or: idiolectal) implication’ (sect. 10). But it can be naturally split up into a number of philosophically fertile subrelations and sub-subrelations, which I will discuss in the following essay (opening sect. 0).