Wahrnehmung und Erkenntnis

in History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis
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The article investigates and defends central elements of Quine’s naturalized epistemology. Davidson’s coherentist attacks on Quine’s empiricismare dismissed. The view is advocated that sensory experience plays an essential epistemic role, and that, therefore, the study of perception must be taken seriously in the theory of knowledge. The author rejects, however, Quine’s behavioristic conception of experience as stimulation of sensory receptors and instead argues for a richer conception, according to which an experience is a sensory state of things appearing in certain ways to us. Finally, it is shown that this standpoint allows us to acknowledge a given element in experience without falling victim to a myth.

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