Save

Methodological and Valuational Priority in Epictetus’ Enchiridion 52

In: History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis
Author: Scott Aikin1
View More View Less
  • 1 Department of Philosophy, College of Arts and Science, Vanderbilt UniversityNashville, TNUSA
Download Citation Get Permissions

Access options

Get access to the full article by using one of the access options below.

Institutional Login

Log in with Open Athens, Shibboleth, or your institutional credentials

Login via Institution

Purchase

Buy instant access (PDF download and unlimited online access):

Abstract

Epictetus’ Enchiridion ends with a paradox—that the methods one learns to do philosophy have results contrary to one’s reasons to do philosophy. One comes to philosophy to improve one’s life, to live with wisdom. This requires that one find truths to live in light of, and in order to find those truths, one must perfect one’s reason. And to perfect one’s reason, one must attend to technical details of reasoning and metaphysics. The trouble is, in attending to these technical details, we develop the capacity for rationalization and find ways to prevent our journey to wisdom. Because we are not wise, we misuse the tools of wisdom. And so the Stoic methodological priority of learning logic first has a downstream consequence of standing in the way of what is of first importance for Stoic philosophy, the life of wisdom. The Enchiridion closes with the reminder that Stoic program must proceed in light of mitigating this conflict of methodological and valuational priority.

Content Metrics

All Time Past Year Past 30 Days
Abstract Views 256 140 26
Full Text Views 3 2 0
PDF Views & Downloads 9 8 0