Pyrrhonism and the Dialectical Methods
The Aims and Argument of Outlines of Pyrrhonism II
In: History of Philosophy & Logical AnalysisAbstract
The aim of this paper is to show how Outlines of Pyrrhonism II constitutes an original, ambitious, and unified skeptical inquiry into logic. My thesis is that Sextus’ argument in Book II is meant to accomplish both its stated goal (to investigate the topics typically grouped together by dogmatists under the heading of “logic”) and an unstated goal. The unstated goal is, in my view, interesting in itself and sheds new light on Sextus’ methodology. The goal is: to suspend judgement on the effectiveness of dogmatic methodologies.
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Pyrrhonism and the Dialectical Methods
The Aims and Argument of Outlines of Pyrrhonism II
In: History of Philosophy & Logical AnalysisAbstract
The aim of this paper is to show how Outlines of Pyrrhonism II constitutes an original, ambitious, and unified skeptical inquiry into logic. My thesis is that Sextus’ argument in Book II is meant to accomplish both its stated goal (to investigate the topics typically grouped together by dogmatists under the heading of “logic”) and an unstated goal. The unstated goal is, in my view, interesting in itself and sheds new light on Sextus’ methodology. The goal is: to suspend judgement on the effectiveness of dogmatic methodologies.
| All Time | Past Year | Past 30 Days | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Abstract Views | 407 | 154 | 23 |
| Full Text Views | 10 | 6 | 0 |
| PDF Views & Downloads | 31 | 22 | 1 |