On Anselm’s Ontological Argument in Proslogion II
In: History of Philosophy & Logical AnalysisAbstract
Formulations of Anselm’s ontological argument have been the subject of a number of recent studies. We examine these studies in light of Anselm’s text and (a) respond to criticisms that have surfaced in reaction to our earlier representations of the argument, (b) identify and defend a more refined representation of Anselm’s argument on the basis of new research, and (c) compare our representation of the argument, which analyzes that than which none greater can be conceived as a definite description, to a representation that analyzes it as an arbitrary name.
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On Anselm’s Ontological Argument in Proslogion II
In: History of Philosophy & Logical AnalysisAbstract
Formulations of Anselm’s ontological argument have been the subject of a number of recent studies. We examine these studies in light of Anselm’s text and (a) respond to criticisms that have surfaced in reaction to our earlier representations of the argument, (b) identify and defend a more refined representation of Anselm’s argument on the basis of new research, and (c) compare our representation of the argument, which analyzes that than which none greater can be conceived as a definite description, to a representation that analyzes it as an arbitrary name.
| All Time | Past Year | Past 30 Days | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Abstract Views | 669 | 536 | 19 |
| Full Text Views | 11 | 10 | 0 |
| PDF Views & Downloads | 36 | 34 | 1 |