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Rechtsethische Aufsätze zu Krieg und Frieden, Freiheit und Schuld, Leben und Tod
Grund- und damit Ewigkeitsfragen des Rechts sind der Gegenstand dieser Aufsätze. Sie öffnen weitläufige Flanken zur Philosophie, insbesondere zur Ethik und zur politischen Philosophie, aber auch zu anderen philosophischen Sphären wie der Philosophie des Geistes und der Metaphysik.
Im ersten Teil geht es um Grenzen der Rechtfertigung tödlicher Gewalt, die Staaten ausüben: in Kriegen gegeneinander, aber in Ausnahmelagen des innerstaatlichen Notstands auch gegen die eigenen Bürger.
Eine legitime Form staatlicher Gewalt ist das Strafrecht. Lässt sich sein Begriff aus archaischen Wurzeln von Rache und Vergeltung erhellen? Setzt strafrechtliche Schuld den freien Willen des Täters voraus? Darf ihn das Recht wegen besonders gravierender Verbrechen als „Feind“, statt als Bürger der Gesellschaft behandeln? Grundfragen, denen der zweite Teil nachgeht.
Der dritte Teil fragt nach den Grenzen zwischen Leben und Tod in der Medizin und nach Zuständigkeit wie Berechtigung, darüber zu entscheiden.
Im ersten Teil geht es um Grenzen der Rechtfertigung tödlicher Gewalt, die Staaten ausüben: in Kriegen gegeneinander, aber in Ausnahmelagen des innerstaatlichen Notstands auch gegen die eigenen Bürger.
Eine legitime Form staatlicher Gewalt ist das Strafrecht. Lässt sich sein Begriff aus archaischen Wurzeln von Rache und Vergeltung erhellen? Setzt strafrechtliche Schuld den freien Willen des Täters voraus? Darf ihn das Recht wegen besonders gravierender Verbrechen als „Feind“, statt als Bürger der Gesellschaft behandeln? Grundfragen, denen der zweite Teil nachgeht.
Der dritte Teil fragt nach den Grenzen zwischen Leben und Tod in der Medizin und nach Zuständigkeit wie Berechtigung, darüber zu entscheiden.
Theorie und Praxis in philosophischer Perspektive
Regeln sind nahezu allgegenwärtig. Sie leiten unser Handeln in den Wissenschaften ebenso wie in Recht, Politik, Schule, Wirtschaft und im alltäglichen Leben. Regeln sind außerdem Dreh- und Angelpunkt im Evaluationsgeschehen. Die vorliegende philosophische Analyse wirft einen genaueren Blick darauf, wie Regeln funktionieren, wie sie Handeln koordinieren und wie sie beurteilt werden können. Eine Regelanalyse unter sprechakttheoretischen Voraussetzungen erlaubt es, die handlungsanleitende Kraft von Regeln zu erklären sowie Regeln rational-argumentativ zu beurteilen. Mit der Bereitstellung eines grundlegenden und anwendungsbezogenen Rahmenwerks der Beurteilung können konkrete und begründete Beurteilungen (zum Beispiel in moralischer Hinsicht) vorgenommen werden. Die gewonnenen Forschungsergebnisse sind auch für Nachbardisziplinen der Philosophie wie Rechts-, Sozial-, Wirtschafts- sowie Politikwissenschaft relevant.
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Self-consciousness, first-person reference, and personal identity are linked fields of research. The book contains contributions from international researchers about topics like pre-reflective and reflexive consciousness, embodiment, temporality, self-location, and the practical implications of personal identity. Among the contributors are Amit Anurag, Irene Breuer, Tony Cheng, Heidi Haanila, Markus Herrmann, Muriel Leuenberger, Maik Niemeck and Jörg Noller.
Gründe, Konflikte und Präzedenzfälle in der Moral
Das Buch „Additiver Partikularismus" ist ein Plädoyer für eine additive Variante des moralischen Partikularismus. Partikularismus ist eine Auffassung darüber, wie moralische Gründe funktionieren: holistisch und nicht additiv. Holistisch bedeutet, dass das, was im einen Fall ein Grund ist, nicht in jedem anderen Fall auch ein Grund sein muss. Gründe verhalten sich nicht additiv, wenn sie ihre Polarität und ihr Gewicht wechselseitig beeinflussen können. Hieraus erwächst eine Skepsis gegenüber Moralprinzipien. Das Projekt hält am Holismus und der Prinzipienskepsis fest, bestreitet aber die Wechselwirkung zwischen Gründen. Es entsteht ein additiver Partikularismus, der über das Phänomen moralischer Konflikte motiviert ist. Anschließend wird die kritische Frage gestellt, inwiefern eine Partikularistin ein über die Zeit hinweg kohärentes System moralischer Urteile ausbilden kann. Der hier unterbreitete Vorschlag verbindet den Partikularismus mit der Idee von Präzedenzfällen aus dem case law.
Synthesizing Generalized Evolution Theory
Do social systems evolve similarly to biological ones and societies similarly to organisms? For some time now, an interdisciplinary paradigm has been developing in this regard: the Generalized Evolution Theory. After pointing out differences between biological and cultural evolution, as well as different inheritance strategies, the book proposes a philosophy of science classification of the different approaches in this vast and ever-growing field of research. It leads from generalized microevolution to generalized macroevolution and to their synthesis. As evolution favors groups with high internal cohesion, it will also favor strategies and reward agents responsible for this cohesion. In the long run, generalized evolution selects those populations that exhibit a higher density of interaction.
Recent aspirations towards the technical perfection of humanity and nature call for a new type of ethics.
The overcoming of all human weakness is often viewed as a personal right as well as a common good. But fully overcoming human weakness would undermine the basis for mutual support and recognition. The achievement of complete technical independence from natural forces would end the embeddedness of humanity within natural history. This book defends the necessity of ethical assessment against the automatism of relying on technical developments or market processes. To identify both the values and ethical limits of technology development, criteria for the goodness of human life, and for nature in general, are required. This includes a meta-ethical discussion of moral objectivity, philosophical anthropology, and moral history. On the basis of that discussion, conclusions are drawn about ethical debates in the domains of medicine, biotechnology, and information technology.
The overcoming of all human weakness is often viewed as a personal right as well as a common good. But fully overcoming human weakness would undermine the basis for mutual support and recognition. The achievement of complete technical independence from natural forces would end the embeddedness of humanity within natural history. This book defends the necessity of ethical assessment against the automatism of relying on technical developments or market processes. To identify both the values and ethical limits of technology development, criteria for the goodness of human life, and for nature in general, are required. This includes a meta-ethical discussion of moral objectivity, philosophical anthropology, and moral history. On the basis of that discussion, conclusions are drawn about ethical debates in the domains of medicine, biotechnology, and information technology.
Action, Identification and Experience
The book offers new answers to two central questions that have been heavily debated, especially in recent years, in the debate on so-called de se skepticism: Is there something special about first-person thinking? And how does it relate to other forms of self-consciousness? The answer to the first question is a resounding "yes." This assertion is justified by the double-reflexive structure, motivational force, and specific concern that first-personal thinking involves. Regarding the second question, the book concludes that there are non-linguistic forms of self-consciousness. However, these should not be understood as representational contents or non-relational properties, but as mental relations that, without themselves being represented, can contribute to the phenomenal character of conscious states. In this respect, the book also provides a justification for the rarely considered impure intentionalism.
A New Theory of Constructive Reasoning
This book develops a modern evolutionary anthropological theory of the cognitive conditions for explanatory descriptions of the world.
Within the broad framework of processual hermeneutics, this monograph studies rationality by investigating what are the fundamental cognitive mechanisms required for the cultural development of rational constructions. It analyses the basic cognitive competences through which the human being connects categories and operations in a manner that allows it to orient itself in the world. If both understanding and explaining are forms of human-specific orientation, what does asking the question “how” imply cognitively? This monograph focuses therefore on the human-specific array of cognitive mechanisms, here referred to as enarrativity.
Within the broad framework of processual hermeneutics, this monograph studies rationality by investigating what are the fundamental cognitive mechanisms required for the cultural development of rational constructions. It analyses the basic cognitive competences through which the human being connects categories and operations in a manner that allows it to orient itself in the world. If both understanding and explaining are forms of human-specific orientation, what does asking the question “how” imply cognitively? This monograph focuses therefore on the human-specific array of cognitive mechanisms, here referred to as enarrativity.
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It has often been noted that liberal democracies are facing a serious political crisis. A common reaction to this situation is to call for more comprehensive or more effective liberal democratic education. This volume discusses some of the most important challenges to and critiques of the paradigm of liberal democratic education. In doing so, it offers novel insights into how liberal democratic education can be amended, extended or qualified to address the special challenges of the current political moment.
Interdisciplinary Reflections
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Scientific progress depends crucially on scientific discoveries. Yet the topic of scientific discoveries has not been central to debate in the philosophy of science. This book aims to remedy this shortcoming. Based on a broad reading of the term “science” (similar to the German term “Wissenschaft ”), the book convenes experts from different disciplines who reflect upon several intertwined questions connected to the topic of making scientific discoveries.
Among these questions are the following: What are the preconditions for making scientific discoveries? What is it that we (have to) do when we make discoveries in science? What are the objects of scientific discoveries, how do we name them, and how do scientific names function? Do dis-coveries in, say, physics and biology, share an underlying structure, or do they differ from each other in crucial ways? Are other fields such as theology and environmental studies loci of scientific discovery? What is the purpose of making scientific discoveries? Explaining nature or reality? Increasing scientific knowledge? Finding new truths? If so, how can we account for instructive blunders and serendipities in science?
In the light of the above, the following is an encompassing question of the book: What does it mean to make a discovery in science, and how can scientific discoveries be distinguished from non-scientific discoveries?
Among these questions are the following: What are the preconditions for making scientific discoveries? What is it that we (have to) do when we make discoveries in science? What are the objects of scientific discoveries, how do we name them, and how do scientific names function? Do dis-coveries in, say, physics and biology, share an underlying structure, or do they differ from each other in crucial ways? Are other fields such as theology and environmental studies loci of scientific discovery? What is the purpose of making scientific discoveries? Explaining nature or reality? Increasing scientific knowledge? Finding new truths? If so, how can we account for instructive blunders and serendipities in science?
In the light of the above, the following is an encompassing question of the book: What does it mean to make a discovery in science, and how can scientific discoveries be distinguished from non-scientific discoveries?