The study of concepts lies at the intersection of various disciplines, both analytic and empiric. The rising cognitive sciences, for instance, are interested in concepts insofar as they are used in an explanation of such diverse epistemic phenomena like categorization, inference, memory, learning, and decision-making. In philosophy, the challenge imposed by conceptualization consists, among other things, in accommodating reverse intuitions about concepts like shareability, mind-dependency, mediation between reference, knowledge and reality, etc. While researchers have collaborated more and more to contribute to a unified understanding of concepts and categorization, the joint venture unfortunately suffers (so far) from the fact that it is generally left unclear how exactly the different approaches undertaken in the participating sciences relate to each other. What do psychologists and philosophers mean by the notion of a concept? Is there a core-theory of concepts and categorization underlying analytical and empirical studies? The present collection of essays addresses these and related questions and tries to answer them from both a systematic and a historical perspective.
The thematic focus of this volume concerns a fruitful discussion between Analytic Philosophy and Classical German Philosophy focusing on ideas of Kant and Hegel and its relation to modern systematic philosophy. While the focus articles were handled by the guest editors, the additional articles were managed by the General editors. Among the latter articles, which were accepted on the basis of the regular call, there are discussions of the work of Parmenides, Plato and Thomas Aquinas. The Authors: Marcos G. Breuer, Paul Clavier, Jacopo Domenicucci, Jasper Doomen, Arthur Kok, Franz von Kutschera, Albert Newen, Julian Nida-Rümelin, Manish Oza, Peter Rohs, Birgit Sandkaulen, Federico Sanguinetti, Richard Schantz, Tobias Schlicht, Benjamin Schnieder, Oliver R. Scholz, Ludwig Siep, Achim Stephan, Pirmin Stekeler-Weithofer, Patrick Toner
Emotions are shaped by evolution and they are shaped by culture. This book explores several ways in which emotions are shaped by culture, and examines what they tells us about the nature of emotions. A crude dichotomy between evolution and culture is certainly not warranted, since evolutionary frameworks can accommodate many cultural influences on emotions. However, the most deeply culturally shaped emotions, those which deserve to be called 'socially constructed', call for significant modifications of existing evolutionary frameworks. This book argues for a new version of Social Constructionism for emotions: Some emotions are social kinds rather than non-social natural kinds. This study thereby introduces new distinctions apart from the familiar distinction between cognitive and non-cognitive emotions. This book includes some applications to topics of practical relevance: jealousy is neither a paradigmatic cognitive emotion nor a paradigmatic basic one. This analysis casts doubt on the cognitive/basic distinction and speaks against an overtly moralized understanding of jealousy. Finally, some arguments about the desirability of exclusivity in romantic relationships are explored.
How do we understand other people’s minds? This question has been discussed intensively in the theory of mind debate. ‘Theory of mind’ is defined as the capacity to attribute mental states to oneself and to others and to make use of that capacity in behavior understanding. This book offers a critical analysis of a variety of tasks that have been conducted to investigate the development of a theory of mind in children. The heart of the book is a pluralistic account of social understanding. Rather than relying on a default procedure of social understanding (e.g., theory or simulation), individuals understand the behavior of another person in various ways dependent on their cognitive competencies and the socio-situational context. As a rule of thumb, individuals are prone to make use of that procedure that is cognitively least effortful to them in a given context. Covering a wide range of studies, the implications of the pluralistic account are discussed with respect to culture and psychopathology. Finally, the book points to the role that social interaction may play in social understanding.
Logical reconstruction is a fundamental philosophical method for achieving clarity concerning the prerequisites, presuppositions and the logical structure of natural language arguments. The scope and limits of this method have become visible not least through its intense application to Anselm of Canterbury’s notorious proofs for the existence of God. This volume collects, on the one hand, reconstructions of Anselmian arguments that take account of the problems of reconstruction and, on the other hand, theoretical reflections on reconstruction with a view to Anselm. We hope that this will allow the reader to critically assess the merits of the theoretical The journal provides a forum for articles in which classical philosophical texts are interpreted by drawing on the resources on modern formal logic. All contributions are double blind peer-reviewed. Information concerning the contents of past volumes (abstracts of all published papers) and plans for future volumes (call for papers, etc.) can be found on the website: www.rub.de/philosophy/pla
Self-knowledge and self-deception present fundamental problems and puzzles to philosophy of mind. In this book accounts of both phenomena are systematically developed and defended against classical and recent views. The proposed 'cognitive ascent model' offers an explanation of the intuitive peculiarity of self-knowledge as well as of the reach and limits of our epistemic privilege. The model builds on a general transparency principle for attitudes. Transparency can be the key to a genuinely first-personal knowledge of attitudes to the extent that someone’s having a certain attitude is to be identified with his attributing a value property to an intentional object. The offered view rejects the strategies of inner sense, parallelism and constitutivism. Paradigmatic self-deception, rather than being a failure of recognizing one’s own mental states is a failure at the level of metacognitive control over belief-formation. Self-deceptive beliefs are formed or maintained against criterial evidence via pseudo-rational adaptations in belief-systems.
The book derives the welfare state from right-libertarian principles and, therefore, arrives at policy prescriptions of the political left based on the philosophical principles of the political right. For that purpose the book offers a detailed analysis of right-libertarianism with a particular focus on the work of Robert Nozick. Further, it engages economic and sociological theory and addresses questions of transgenerational compensation, causation, historical wrongs, and collective responsibility. The discussion of transgenerational compensation includes an in-depth treatment of the non-identity problem. The final chapters spell out the arguments’ specific implications for public policy and philosophical theory.
The purpose of this collection of eleven essays on the philosophy of Edmund Husserl is not to offer a comprehensive overview of Husserl’s philosophy. Of his many themes, only a selection is covered in this volume. But the collection is of interest for anyone in touch with the current philosophy of mind – which has undergone a remarkable broadening of its perspective: now, not only the causal and functional, but also the, broadly speaking, phenomenological and intentional aspects of the mind are being given what is due to them. Accompanying this broadening, there is a rediscovery – which for many philosophers from the analytic tradition means: a first discovery – of Husserlian phenomenology. The centre of this collection is formed by the five essays on Husserl’s views on perceptual experience and perceptual justification. These central essays are preceded by an essay on apprehension and an essay on motivation (both important Husserlian notions), and are followed by an essay on empathy and an essay on emotions (two Husserlian topics that are all too often neglected). The first essay of the collection presents, in a comprehensive and detailed way, complementarism as an alternative to Husserl’s classical phenomenological approach, transcendental reduction. The last essay concerns the issue of collective unity in Kant and Husserl, an ontological issue that is crucial for all transcendental philosophy. All of the eleven essays are new and have undergone a peer-review process. The authors: Audrey L. Anton, Carleton B. Christensen, Jasper Doomen, John J. Drummond, Richard Foley, Stamatios Gerogiorgakis, Michael Groneberg, George Heffernan, Hans-Ulrich Hoche, Burt C. Hopkins, Ansten Klev, Helga Meier, Manuel Lechthaler, Sophie Loidolt, Filip Mattens, Verena Mayer, Sean McAleer, Tommaso Piazza, Alexander Reutlinger, Adriane A. Rini, Sara L. Uckelman, Philip J. Walsh, Christian Wirrwitz, Kristina Zuelicke
Scepticism, the view that knowledge is impossible, threatens our conception of ourselves as epistemic subjects as much as it endangers our conception of the external world. The book develops a modal account of knowledge and provides an answer to scepticism based on a detailed examination of the main sceptical argument. It discusses prominent contemporary theories of knowledge, in particular safety and sensitivity theories, and shows that they cannot handle Gettier-type examples of a new kind. An alternative analysis of knowledge in terms of relevantly normal possibilities is developed. The sceptical argument addressed aims to show that we cannot know ordinary things because we cannot rule out that we are in a sceptical scenario. Classical responses, like dogmatism, non-closure theories, and epistemic contextualism, are explored and rejected as unnecessary for a refutation of the sceptical argument. A detailed investigation reveals, first, that the failure to know that we are not in a sceptical scenario does not conflict with ordinary knowledge, but only with knowledge that we know, and, second, that we can indeed know that we are not in a sceptical scenario. It is therefore claimed not only that we know, but also that we know that we know.
The central aim of this volume is to foster a new understanding of Aristotle’s Sophistical Refutations and thereby to enrich our knowledge of the beginnings of logical analysis. An important service for the scientific community to support this aim is the edition of a new translation of Aristotle’s work into English. The contributions discussing the original work were inspired by a onference in 2009 in Berlin which was the first one exclusively dedicated to Sophistical Refutations of Aristotle and brought together nearly everyone working on the main topics Aristotle deals with in that work. In Aristotle we see the onset of systematic theorizing about argumentation, including an account of the ways in which arguments, despite of being incorrect, may appear to be correct and of the relations between different types of argumentation (in science, in discussions with various purposes, in everyday life), but also of the connections with more general philosophical issues, like the meaning of words and the ontological status of universals. Fallacious Arguments in Ancient Philosophy It is, however, primarily because of its account of argumentation that Aristotle’s Sophistical Refutations, together with the Topics, has caught the attention of those working in the field of argumentation theory. This collection shows that the study of argumentation theory in Ancient Philosophy, and with Aristotle in particular, is in good shape. At least some of the points made in the articles brought together here will withstand scrutiny and will advance our understanding of the beginnings of logical analysis. The authors: Jonathan Adler (†), Susanne Bobzien, Robert Bolton, Luca Castagnoli, Louis-André Dorion, Paolo Fait, Adrian Frey, Pieter Sjoerd Hasper, Wolfgang Kienzler, Colin Guthrie King, Raina Kirchhoff, Ermelinda Valentina di Lascio, Yakir Levin, Christof Rapp, Carrie Swanson - the first translation of Aristotle’s Sophistical Refutations (transl. by P.S. Hasper)