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Menschliche Schönheit ist eine eigenständige Form von Schönheit, die am besten als sinnlich wahrnehmbare Liebenswürdigkeit gedeutet werden kann.
Obwohl das Thema der menschlichen Schönheit in unserer Gesellschaft omnipräsent ist, wird es in der zeitgenössischen Philosophie nur am Rande diskutiert. Um die Debatte wiederzubeleben, wirft dieses Buch einen systematisch-analytischen und historischen Blick auf menschliche Schönheit und diskutiert dabei auch die Erkenntnisse der empirischen Attraktivitätsforschung. Den Ausgangspunkt bildet hierbei die Frage, ob menschliche Schönheit „von innen“ kommt. Inspiriert von Kants, Schillers und Burkes Sicht auf menschliche Schönheit entwickelt dieses Buch eine charakterologische Theorie, der zufolge menschliche Schönheit sinnlich wahrnehmbare Liebenswürdigkeit ist. Bei einem schönen Menschen trifft physische Schönheit auf den sinnlich wahrnehmbaren, körpergebundenen Ausdruck innerer Schönheit, verstanden als beziehungsrelevante Tugendhaftigkeit.
Obwohl das Thema der menschlichen Schönheit in unserer Gesellschaft omnipräsent ist, wird es in der zeitgenössischen Philosophie nur am Rande diskutiert. Um die Debatte wiederzubeleben, wirft dieses Buch einen systematisch-analytischen und historischen Blick auf menschliche Schönheit und diskutiert dabei auch die Erkenntnisse der empirischen Attraktivitätsforschung. Den Ausgangspunkt bildet hierbei die Frage, ob menschliche Schönheit „von innen“ kommt. Inspiriert von Kants, Schillers und Burkes Sicht auf menschliche Schönheit entwickelt dieses Buch eine charakterologische Theorie, der zufolge menschliche Schönheit sinnlich wahrnehmbare Liebenswürdigkeit ist. Bei einem schönen Menschen trifft physische Schönheit auf den sinnlich wahrnehmbaren, körpergebundenen Ausdruck innerer Schönheit, verstanden als beziehungsrelevante Tugendhaftigkeit.
Eine Untersuchung zur epistemischen Abhängigkeit
Unter welchen Bedingungen sind wir geneigt, der Aussage eines Mitmenschen zu glauben?
In den meisten Fällen sind wir gerechtfertigt, der Aussage eines Mitmenschen zu glauben, sofern wir keinen konkreten Anlass haben, an seiner Verlässlichkeit zu zweifeln. Dies gilt jedoch nicht, wenn sehr hohe praktische Risiken mit einer Fehlinformation einhergehen. In einem solchen Fall benötigen wir stets erfahrungsbasierte Gründe, die für die besondere Kompetenz der fraglichen Person auf dem relevanten Gebiet sprechen. Das gilt unabhängig davon, ob wir konkreten Anlass dazu haben, an der Verlässlichkeit dieser Person zu zweifeln.
In den meisten Fällen sind wir gerechtfertigt, der Aussage eines Mitmenschen zu glauben, sofern wir keinen konkreten Anlass haben, an seiner Verlässlichkeit zu zweifeln. Dies gilt jedoch nicht, wenn sehr hohe praktische Risiken mit einer Fehlinformation einhergehen. In einem solchen Fall benötigen wir stets erfahrungsbasierte Gründe, die für die besondere Kompetenz der fraglichen Person auf dem relevanten Gebiet sprechen. Das gilt unabhängig davon, ob wir konkreten Anlass dazu haben, an der Verlässlichkeit dieser Person zu zweifeln.
Abstract
According to Philoponus, the activity of drawing syllogisms is a dynamic operation. Following the classical idea that actions are specified by their objects and habitual powers by their actions, Philoponus concludes that only a dynamic power can elicit the act of syllogizing. This power is identified with discursive reasoning (dianoia). Imagination, on the contrary, is a static power, that cannot elicit that particular motion of drawing a syllogistic inference. The issue, however, is not entirely uncontroversial, because Ammonius maintains that sophistical syllogisms can only be formed by imagination, since they involve “empty concepts” as terms and only imagination can form such concepts. In this paper I will reconstruct Philoponus’ and Ammonius’ theories about the “activity” of syllogizing, and I shall explain how Philoponus can deal with sophistical syllogisms in a consistent way.
Abstract
Damascius has become well-known in recent scholarship for his unique, radical use of the aporetic method, both to highlight the inherent limits of human thought and to reveal crucial tensions in Neoplatonic metaphysics. Though much attention has been paid to the subjective or skeptical aspects of Damascius’ aporiai, little has been noted of the parallels between Damascius’ aporetic strategy in the De Principiis and Aristotle’s own in Metaphysics B. This article analyzes the parallel by looking at Aristotle’s aim for aporiai in Metaphysics B.1 and closely comparing, as a case study, the De Principiis’ first aporia alongside Metaphysics B’s first aporia. Despite Damascius’ aporia dealing with different principles compared to Aristotle’s, the aporetic method for both ultimately exposes the limitations of thought and, exactly in the domain of these limitations, clarifies our concepts in relating to reality and attaining determinate understanding of principles.
Abstract
The present paper investigates the question as to how and for what purposes the Middle Platonic author of the Anonymous Commentary on Plato’s Theaetetus uses Aristotelian and Stoic syllogistic in his interpretation of the Platonic text. This investigation shows that the commentator employs Aristotelian categorical syllogistic as an exegetical tool for reconstructing arguments in the Platonic text, enabling him not only to uncover doctrinal statements that are in his view hidden in the Platonic text, but also to dissociate Plato from unwelcome propositions. By contrast, the commentator uses Stoic hypothetical syllogistic as a polemical tool for constructing ad hominem arguments against the Stoics. More precisely, the author exploits the Stoic type of deductive reasoning to draw anti-Stoic conclusions from premises that are accepted by the Stoics, and in doing so, he manages not only to refute Stoic doctrines, but also to corroborate the corresponding Platonic theories.
Abstract
In this paper I explore the ways in which Alexander of Aphrodisias employs and develops so-called ‘common notions’ as reliable starting points of deductive arguments. He combines contemporary developments in the Stoic and Epicurean use of common notions with Aristotelian dialectic, and axioms. This more comprehensive concept of common notions can be extracted from Alexander’s commentary on Metaphysics A 1–2. Alexander puts Aristotle’s claim that ‘all human beings by nature desire to know’ in a larger deductive framework, and adds weight to Aristotle’s use of the common understanding of the notion of ‘wisdom’. Finally I will indicate how these upgraded common notions are meant to play an important role in the general framework of metaphysics as a science.
Abstract
Olympiodorus led the Platonist school of philosophy at Alexandria for several decades in the sixth century, and both Platonic and Aristotelian commentaries ascribed to him survive. During this time the school’s attitude to the teaching of Aristotelian syllogistic, originally owing something to Ammonius, changed markedly, with an early tendency to reinforce the teaching of syllogistic even in Platonist lectures giving way to a greater awareness of its limitations. The vocabulary for arguments and their construction becomes far commoner than the language of syllogistic and syllogistic figures, and also of demonstration. I discuss the value of these changes for the dating of certain works, especially where the text lectured on does not demand different emphases. The commitment to argument rather than to authority continues, but a greater emphasis eventually falls on the establishment of the premises than on formal validity.
Abstract
In late antiquity, logic developed into what Ebbesen calls the LAS, the Late Ancient Standard. This paper discusses the Neoplatonic use of LAS, as informed by epistemological and metaphysical concerns. It demonstrates this through an analysis of the late ancient debate about hypothetical and categorical logic as manifest in the practice of syllogizing Platonic dialogues. After an introduction of the Middle Platonist view on Platonic syllogistic as present in Alcinous, this paper presents an overview of its application in the syllogizing practice of Proclus and others. That overview shows that the two types were considered two sides of the same coin, to be used for the appropriate occasions, and both relying on the methods of dialectic as revealing the structure of knowledge and reality. Pragmatics, dialectic, and didactic choices determine which type or combination is selected in syllogizing Plato. So even though there is no specific Neoplatonic logic, there is a specific Neoplatonic use of LAS.