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In: History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis

Abstract

The paper provides a reconstruction of proof by contradiction in Kant’s pure general logic. A seemingly less-explored point of view on this topic is how apagogical proof can account for the formal truth of a judgement. Integrating the argument held by Kjosavik (2019), I intend to highlight how one can use proof by contradiction, conceived as a modus tollens, to establish the logical actuality (logical or formal truth) of a cognition. Although one might agree on the capacity of the proof to prove formal falsity, the logical actuality of a judgement is assessable based on a logically grounded judgement and, as for transcendental logic, this cognitive operation has to presuppose the real possibility of an object.

In: History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis
In: History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis
Author: Simon Dierig

Abstract

In this essay, I discuss three readings of Descartes’ Meditations. According to the first reading, “I exist” is for Descartes the foundation of our knowledge. This reading is dismissed on the grounds that, in his view, as long as God’s existence is not proven there is a good reason to doubt this proposition. Proponents of the second reading claim that there are two kinds of Cartesian knowledge: perfect and imperfect knowledge. The meditator has imperfect knowledge of “I exist” before God’s existence is proven. Subsequently, she acquires perfect knowledge of various metaphysical theorems. This reading is repudiated, too. I argue for a third reading, according to which “I think” – and not “I exist” – is the foundation of our knowledge.

In: History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis
Die Reihe „Perspektiven der analytischen Philosophie“, zunächst von Georg Meggle und Julian Nida-Rümelin und seit 2021 von Jochen Briesen und Ulla Wessels herausgegeben, umfasst bislang mehr als 35 Bände. Sie ist offen für alle Forschungsarbeiten, die sich aus systematischer Perspektive mit Problemen der theoretischen oder praktischen Philosophie auseinandersetzen und eigene Akzente setzen. Sie ist dem Ideal verpflichtet, Voraussetzungen, Argumente und Schlussfolgerungen sorgfältig und präzise anzuführen, um so ein hohes Maß an Klarheit, Kritisierbarkeit sowie Anbindbarkeit an andere Disziplinen zu gewährleisten. Die Expertise des Herausgeber-Teams sowie die qualitätssichernde Begutachtung – auch unter Zuhilfenahme wissenschaftlicher Beraterinnen und Berater – gewährleisten eine hohe wissenschaftliche Qualität der Publikationen.
Sprachen: Deutsch, Englisch
Author: I-Kai Jeng

Abstract

This paper examines the terms ‘elenchos’ and ‘elenchō’ as they occur in the Sophist in order to reveal a refined view of elenchos as a philosophical method. The explicit discussion of elenchos as a method in 226a6–231b8 must be read together with other passages described by these terms. Once this is done, it shall be seen that there are two types of elenchus employed in several ways. The first type, which I identify with the familiar Socratic elenchus, is used to purge false opinions or to arrive at plausible answers to philosophical difficulties. The second type, which appears to be the Stranger’s own method, is used to positively disclose relations between Forms. On this reading, elenchos is not merely destructive or preparatory for dialectic; it also forms a part of it.

In: History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis

Abstract

Formulations of Anselm’s ontological argument have been the subject of a number of recent studies. We examine these studies in light of Anselm’s text and (a) respond to criticisms that have surfaced in reaction to our earlier representations of the argument, (b) identify and defend a more refined representation of Anselm’s argument on the basis of new research, and (c) compare our representation of the argument, which analyzes that than which none greater can be conceived as a definite description, to a representation that analyzes it as an arbitrary name.

In: History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis
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In: History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis
Author: Mark Siebel

Abstract

Kant distinguishes concept negation from copula negation. While the latter results in a negative judgement, i.e. a judgement denying a property of certain objects, the former gives rise to a negative concept, such as ‘immortal’. Since Kant’s remarks on concept negation are scattered and inconclusive, five interpretations are worked out and put to the test: logical negation, pseudo-negation, attribution of a zero degree, possibility-restricted negation and genus-restricted negation. Whereas the first four interpretations fail for a number of reasons, genus-restricted negation turns out to be tenable.

In: History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis
Author: Michael Wallner

Abstract

Husserl famously argues that it is essential to perception to present the perceived object in perspectives. Hence, there is no – and there cannot be – perception without perspectival givenness. Yet, it seems that there are counterexamples to this essentialist claim, for we seem to be able to imagine beings that do not perceive in perspectives. Recently, there have been some accounts in the literature that critically discuss those counterexamples and assess to what extent they succeed in challenging Husserl’s essentialist claim. In this paper I discuss three different answers to these counterexamples, all of them are found wanting. I offer a novel solution, taking into account some crucial findings of the contemporary debate about imagination and modality. I argue that this new solution is capable of fully vindicating Husserl’s essentialist claim. Finally, I reconstruct Husserl’s own way to treat such counterexamples, in order to showcase the notion of modality Husserlian phenomenology relies on. I argue for the hitherto widely underappreciated point that Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology cannot appeal to strictly absolute modality but that the kind of modality in Husserlian phenomenology is conditional on the facticity that we have the transcendental structure we do in fact have.

In: History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis