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Abstract
In this paper I offer a reconstruction of one of Husserl’s various anti-materialist arguments. Husserl hints at this argument in Ideas II & III where he exposes essential differences between mental and material reality (Realität). At its core, Husserl claims that mental entities by their very essence can never be in the same qualitative condition at different times. By sharp contrast, for purely material or physical entities such a cyclical development is not essentially excluded. Accordingly, I will speak of Husserl’s argument from irreversibility. I argue that this argument is modal in nature, and that it can be used to make a case against materialism based on the necessary supervenience of the mental on the physical. My primary goal is to elucidate this argument, and to offer a logical reconstruction using basic modal logic and contemporary notions of supervenience. I conclude that Husserl’s argument is formally valid, and that it can even held to be sound, although the premise regarding the necessary irreversibility of the mental requires further clarification.
Abstract
In the Physics, Aristotle says that there is no change associated with the category of relatives. In this paper, I examine a widespread but neglected strategy that medieval thinkers use to understand Aristotle’s claim. According to this strategy, which I label initial presence, if there is no change in the category of relatives, it is because the relation-properties are already present in their subject as soon as the properties on which relation-properties are founded exist. Appreciating the importance of this strategy is crucial not only for understanding medieval theories of relation but also for assessing the credibility of arguments used in the secondary literature to interpret medieval texts, in particular a well-known passage from Thomas Aquinas’s commentary on the Physics.
Ein anderer Blick auf die Philosophie des „Mittelalters“
Das Buch zeigt, warum es kein Mittelalter gegeben hat, und warum sich auf diese Weise ein ganz neuer Blick auf 1000 Jahre Philosophie eröffnet. Es zeigt zugleich, dass dieses Jahrtausend vielgestaltig und vielsprachig, interdisziplinär, transkulturell und multireligiös war. Das gilt auch für die Philosophie. Das gemeinsame spätantike Erbe bildete den Ausgangspunkt für vielfältige Austauschbeziehungen über Sprachgrenzen hinweg. Hierfür bietet das Buch viele anschauliche Beispiele. Grundlage sind die Übersetzungen aus dem Griechischen in das Arabische, Hebräische und Lateinische. Zugleich werden zentrale philosophische Fragen weiterentwickelt. Die Erweiterung der Wissenschaften erhält ihren Ort an verschiedenen Bildungsinstitutionen, vor allem an den neuen Universitäten, die ab dem 13. Jahrhundert ihren weltweiten Siegeszug antreten. Eine zentrale Rolle spielt die Philosophie, die dieses vielfältige Jahrtausend wie keine andere Wissenschaft repräsentiert und in Gedanken fasst.
Abstract
In this paper, I address the issue of what kind of distinction separates the attributes of Spinoza’s substance. I propose to consider the distinction between attributes neither as a real distinction nor as a pure distinction of reason. Instead, I ventilate the alternative of understanding attributes as distinguished by a hybrid distinction, of which I trace the development during the Medieval and Early Modern eras. With the term hybrid, I capture distinctions which are neither a real distinction between substances or real accidents; nor a pure distinction of reason, produced or fabricated by the intellect. I shall argue that Spinoza’s notion of attribute falls under the scope of a hybrid distinction, thus sidestepping the longstanding debate between objectivism and subjectivism.