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Eine Philosophie der Philosophie
Dieses Buch hat nicht die Form einer Monographie. Es ist ein philosophisches und zugleich literarisches Buch: Die fiktiven Philosophen Bill Headstrong und Wilhelm Kornblum ringen leidenschaftlich um ihren Lieblingsautor William James (1842-1910) und die eigentliche Bedeutung der Philosophie.
Ihre Arbeit an einem gemeinsamen Buch fußt auf bestimmten philosophischen Grundsätzen: So gehen beide davon aus, dass nur ein wahrer Mensch auch ein guter Philosoph sein kann, und dass philosophische Wahrheiten sich nur durch den ganzen Menschen samt seinen emotionalen Fähigkeiten erkennen lassen. Im Laufe ihrer Zusammenarbeit müssen Headstrong und Kornblum allerdings feststellen, wie verschieden sie diese Grundsätze auffassen. Letztlich wird ihr Buch in der ursprünglich geplanten Form nie erscheinen. Stattdessen präsentiert Vernunft und Temperament die von beiden Philosophen jeweils beigesteuerten Kapitel, in denen wesentliche existentielle Fragen behandelt werden, zusammen mit ihrem kontrovers geführten Briefwechsel.
Gottlob Frege wider den Zeitgeist
G9–84–92–93–02. Diesen fünfstelligen Schlüssel kennt der philosophische Kanon. Mit ihm erschließt sich das intellektuelle Wirken Gottlob Freges, verfasst in der Sprache der Logik. Doch wer kennt die Folge 82–87–99–06–08? Mit ihr öffnet sich der Subtext im Leben des Logikers, verfasst in der Sprache der Rhetorik. Die polemische Tonspur wurde zur autobiographischen Textur eines streitbaren Daseins wider den Zeitgeist, das mit einem Missverständnis seinen Anfang nahm und im Schweigen endete. Es ist dies die Geschichte Freges im Schatten seiner epochalen Werke. Hier wird sie erzählt.
in Analysis and Explication in 20th Century Philosophy

What does the way we clarify and revise concepts reveal about the nature of concepts? This paper investigates the ontological commitments of conceptual analysis and explication regarding their supposed subject matter–concepts. It demonstrates the benefits of a cognitivist account of concepts, according to which they are not items on which the subject operates cognitively, but rather ways in which the subject operates. The proposed view helps to handle alternating references to ‘concepts’ and ‘terms’ in instructions on analysis and explication. Furthermore, its virtue lies not in the capacity to render concepts ‘shareable’ but in its ontological parsimony.

in Analysis and Explication in 20th Century Philosophy

Pseudoproblems, pseudoquestions, pseudosentences (etc.) constitute an iridescent group of concepts which were prominently used by the Vienna Circle (including Wittgenstein). In the course of an explication this paper presents a compilation of the many different meanings that were given to these expressions. This includes the more prominent Viennese approaches as well as a more recent one by Roy Sorensen. A novel proposal concerning the use of the term is made, suggesting that nothing is just a pseudoproblem, but only relative to a certain state of discourse. While the paper follows an explicative methodology, several uses of ‘pseudoproblem’ , including the explicated one, relate pseudoproblemhood to other kinds of analysis.

in Analysis and Explication in 20th Century Philosophy
in Analysis and Explication in 20th Century Philosophy
in Analysis and Explication in 20th Century Philosophy
in Analysis and Explication in 20th Century Philosophy

Collingwood’s An Essay on Philosophical Method provides an insightful critique of Russell’s analysis and metaphysics of logical atomism, proposing an unduly neglected neo - idealist alternative to Russell’s philosophical method. I summarize Collingwood’s critique of analysis and sympathetically outline the philosophical methodology of Collingwood’s post - Hegelian dialectical method: his scale of forms methodology, grounded on the overlap of philosophical classes. I then delineate Collingwood’s critique of the metaphysics of logical atomism, demonstrating how the scale of forms methodology is opposed to Russell’s logical atomism. Finally, I reflect on the reasons Collingwood’s Essay aroused little interest upon publication and the importance of continually rethinking the history of philosophy.

in Analysis and Explication in 20th Century Philosophy

In this paper, it is argued that there are relevant similarities between Aristotle’s account of definition and Carnap’s account of explication. To show this, first, Aristotle’s conditions of adequacy for definitions are provided and an outline of the main critique put forward against Aristotle’s account of definition is given. Subsequently, Carnap’s conditions of adequacy for explications are presented and discussed. It is shown that Aristotle’s conditions of extensional correctness can be interpreted against the backdrop of Carnap’s condition of similarity once one skips Aristotelian essentialism and takes a Carnapian and more pragmatic stance. Finally, it is argued that, in general, a complementary rational reconstruction of both approaches allows for resolving problems of interpretational underdetermination.

in Analysis and Explication in 20th Century Philosophy