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Die Zeit der „philosophischen Systeme“ scheint seit Kant und Hegel endgültig vorbei. Darum ist das Erscheinen des Werkes „Neues System der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundriss“ ein geradezu spektakuläres philosophisches Ereignis: Dirk Hartmann schließt mit seinem Werktitel bewusst an Hegels „Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse“ von 1817 an, um Absicht und Anspruch seines opus magnum deutlich zu machen: Im Gegensatz zur verstärkten Fragmentarisierung und Spezialisierung der Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert geht Hartmann auf die philosophische Behandlung des Ganzen: In sieben Bänden erörtert er die klassischen philosophischen Problemstellungen in ihrem Zusammenhang – gleichermaßen für die Natur- wie die Geisteswissenschaften – nicht katalogisch nacheinander, sondern indem er sie konsequent auseinander entwickelt.
Als ein für das gesamte Werk grundlegendes Prinzip, das Hartmann als Sinnprinzip begründet, erweist sich das Prinzip der Wissbarkeit – dass das Wahre prinzipiell gewusst werden kann. In diesem antirealistischen Prinzip – der „einen Idee“, von der Kant spricht - manifestiert sich der Idealismus in seiner modernen, zeitgemäßen Form.

Dieses Referenzwerk ist auch online auf der Major Reference Works-Plattform von Brill erhältlich.

The time of „philosophical systems“ seems to be definitively over since Kant and Hegel. On this background, the publication of the work „Neues System der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundriss“ (New System of Philosophical Sciences in Ground Plan) is a truly spectacular philosophical event: Dirk Hartmann deliberately follows Hegel‘s „Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse“ of 1817 in the title of his work, in order to make clear the intention and claim of his opus magnum: In contrast to the increased fragmentation and specialization of philosophy in the 20th century, Hartmann focuses on the philosophical treatment of the whole: In seven volumes, he discusses the classical philosophical problems in their interdependent context, not cataloguing them one after the other, but by consistently developing them from one another.

This reference work is also available online on the Major Reference Works platform by Brill.
Universitätsphilosophie in Münster
Philosophiert und Philosophie gelehrt wurde an der Universität Münster von Anfang an im Spannungsfeld von Pietät und Weltbezug. Sind es einerseits die Pietät gegenüber der christlichen, in Münster vor allem katholisch geprägten Religion und der Respekt vor der Geschichtlichkeit des menschlichen Denkens wie der menschlichen Existenz überhaupt, die die Münsteraner Universitätsphilosophie prägen, dokumentiert deren Geschichte zugleich immer neue Facetten philosophischen Weltbezugs – und eine erstaunliche Offenheit für neue Impulse, wie sie beispielsweise im zwanzigsten Jahrhundert von der formalen Logik, der analytischen Philosophie und der Erneuerung der praktischen Philosophie ausgegangen sind. Aus Anlass der Eröffnung des neuen Philosophikums der Universität Münster versammelt dieser Band Studien zur Geschichte der Münsterschen Universitätsphilosophie von der Universitätsgründung 1780 bis zur Ausgliederung der Naturwissenschaften aus der Philosophischen Fakultät 1948 und zu den drei Philosophen, die Münsters Universitätsphilosophie im zwanzigsten Jahrhundert nachhaltig geprägt haben: Heinrich Scholz, Joachim Ritter und Hans Blumenberg. Die Beiträger: Margarita Kranz, Johannes Müller-Salo, Birgit Recki, Reinold Schmücker, Niko Strobach

Abstract

In fragments of the lost Protrepticus, preserved in Iamblichus, Aristotle responds to Isocrates’ worries about the excessive demandingness of theoretical philosophy. Contrary to Isocrates, Aristotle holds that such philosophy is generally feasible for human beings. In defense of this claim, Aristotle offers the progress argument, which appeals to early Greek philosophers’ rapid success in attaining exact understanding. In this paper, I explore and evaluate this argument. After making clarificatory exegetical points, I examine the argument’s premises in light of pressing worries that the argument reasonably faces in its immediate intellectual context, the dispute between Isocrates and Aristotle. I also relate the argument to modern concerns about philosophical progress. I contend that the argument withstands these worries, and thereby constitutes a reasonable Aristotelian response to the Isocratean challenge.

In: History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis
Author: Benjamin Wilck

Abstract

In this article, I tackle an heretofore unnoticed difficulty with the application of Pyrrhonian scepticism to scientific definitions. Sceptics can suspend belief regarding a dogmatic proposition only by setting up opposing arguments or considerations for and against that proposition. Since Sextus provides arguments exclusively against particular geometrical definitions in Adversus Mathematicos III, commentators have argued that Sextus’ method is not scepticism, but negative dogmatism. However, commentators have overlooked the fact that arguments or considerations in favour of particular geometrical definitions were absent in ancient geometry, and hence unavailable to Sextus. While this might explain why they are also absent from Sextus’ text, I survey and evaluate various strategies to supply arguments in support of particular geometrical definitions.

In: History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis
Author: Keith Begley

Abstract

I offer an examination of a core element in the reflectiveness of Heraclitus’ thought, namely, his rebuke of polymathy. In doing so, I provide a response to a recent claim that Heraclitus should not be considered to be a philosopher, by attending to his paradigmatically philosophical traits. Regarding Heraclitus’ attitude to that naïve form of ‘wisdom’, i.e., polymathy, I argue that he does not advise avoiding experience of many things, rather, he advises rejecting experience of things as merely many independent things in their manifoldness, and, instead, to understand their unity and thereby to unify our knowledge of them.

In: History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis
Author: Máté Veres

Abstract

Pyrrhonian inquiry responds to the hope of intellectual tranquillity, and aims at the achievement and maintenance of said tranquillity. According to the Tranquillity Charge, philosophical inquiry aims at the truth; hence, insofar as Pyrrhonian inquiry aims at tranquillity, it does not qualify as philosophical inquiry. Furthermore, Pyrrhonian philanthropy rests on the Partisan Premise, i.e. the claim that all philosophers aim at the removal of psychological disturbance. I show that the origin-story of Pyrrhonism evades the Tranquillity Charge, and that the Partisan Premise is not as partisan as it seems. Unlike previous attempts, my reconstruction preserves all tranquillity-related features of Sextan Pyrrhonism.

In: History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis
Author: Scott Aikin

Abstract

Epictetus’ Enchiridion ends with a paradox—that the methods one learns to do philosophy have results contrary to one’s reasons to do philosophy. One comes to philosophy to improve one’s life, to live with wisdom. This requires that one find truths to live in light of, and in order to find those truths, one must perfect one’s reason. And to perfect one’s reason, one must attend to technical details of reasoning and metaphysics. The trouble is, in attending to these technical details, we develop the capacity for rationalization and find ways to prevent our journey to wisdom. Because we are not wise, we misuse the tools of wisdom. And so the Stoic methodological priority of learning logic first has a downstream consequence of standing in the way of what is of first importance for Stoic philosophy, the life of wisdom. The Enchiridion closes with the reminder that Stoic program must proceed in light of mitigating this conflict of methodological and valuational priority.

In: History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis
In: History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis
Author: Justin Vlasits

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to show how Outlines of Pyrrhonism II constitutes an original, ambitious, and unified skeptical inquiry into logic. My thesis is that Sextus’ argument in Book II is meant to accomplish both its stated goal (to investigate the topics typically grouped together by dogmatists under the heading of “logic”) and an unstated goal. The unstated goal is, in my view, interesting in itself and sheds new light on Sextus’ methodology. The goal is: to suspend judgement on the effectiveness of dogmatic methodologies.

In: History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis