Eine Verteidigung des Epiphänomenalismus
Die Annahme, dass mentale Zustände wie Überzeugungen, Wünsche und Gefühle physische Ereignisse bewirken (wie körperliches Verhalten und willentliche Handlungen), ist ebenso verbreitet wie problematisch, weil sie im Widerspruch zu der Überzeugung steht, dass mentale Zustände Phänomene nichtphysischer Natur sind und physische Phänomene ausschließlich physische Ursachen haben. Der Epiphänomenalismus, der diesen als Leib-Seele-Problem bekannten Widerspruch auflöst, indem er die kausale Wirksamkeit des Mentalen bestreitet, stößt unter Laien und Philosophen jedoch auf erheblichen Widerstand. Die vorliegende Studie wendet sich den Intuitionen zu, die sich einer epiphänomenalistischen Auflösung des Leib-Seele-Problems in den Weg stellen: einerseits die innere Erfahrung unserer Urheberschaft, andererseits unser Selbstverständnis als handelnde Personen. Es wird argumentiert, dass die durch die Berufung auf diese Intuitionen zum Ausdruck gebrachten, selten jedoch ausdrücklich vorgebrachten Argumente für die These der mentalen Kausalität allesamt nicht überzeugen können. Vielmehr ist der Epiphänomenalismus sowohl mit unserer inneren als auch unserer äußeren Lebenswirklichkeit vereinbar.

The nature of intuitions remains a contested issue in (meta-)philosophy. Yet, intuitions are frequently cited in philosophical work, featuring most prominently in conceptual analysis, the philosophical method par excellence. In this paper, we approach the question about the nature of intuitions based on a pragmatist, namely, Wittgensteinian account of concepts. To Wittgenstein, intuitions are just immediate ‘reactions’ to certain cognitive tasks. His view provides a distinct alternative to identifying intuitions with either doxastic states or quasi-perceptual experiences. We discuss its implications for intuitions’ role in conceptual analysis and show that a Wittgensteinian account of intuitions is compatible even with ambitious metaphysical projects traditionally associated with this method.

in History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis

The nature of intuitions remains a contested issue in (meta-)philosophy. Yet, intuitions are frequently cited in philosophical work, featuring most prominently in conceptual analysis, the philosophical method par excellence. In this paper, we approach the question about the nature of intuitions based on a pragmatist, namely, Wittgensteinian account of concepts. To Wittgenstein, intuitions are just immediate ‘ reactions ’ to certain cognitive tasks. His view provides a distinct alternative to identifying intuitions with either doxastic states or quasi-perceptual experiences. We discuss its implications for intuitions’ role in conceptual analysis and show that a Wittgensteinian account of intuitions is compatible even with ambitious metaphysical projects traditionally associated with this method.

in Analysis and Explication in 20th Century Philosophy
in History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis
Systematic and Historical Perspectives
HerausgeberInnen: David Hommen, Christoph Kann und Tanja Oswald
The study of concepts lies at the intersection of various disciplines, both analytic and empiric. The rising cognitive sciences, for instance, are interested in concepts insofar as they are used in an explanation of such diverse epistemic phenomena like categorization, inference, memory, learning, and decision-making. In philosophy, the challenge imposed by conceptualization consists, among other things, in accommodating reverse intuitions about concepts like shareability, mind-dependency, mediation between reference, knowledge and reality, etc. While researchers have collaborated more and more to contribute to a unified understanding of concepts and categorization, the joint venture unfortunately suffers (so far) from the fact that it is generally left unclear how exactly the different approaches undertaken in the participating sciences relate to each other. What do psychologists and philosophers mean by the notion of a concept? Is there a core-theory of concepts and categorization underlying analytical and empirical studies? The present collection of essays addresses these and related questions and tries to answer them from both a systematic and a historical perspective.
Ever since the rise of the so-called analytic school in 20th century philosophy, philosophical analysis has often been considered to be synonymous with conceptual analysis. However, criticism has also been levelled at the conceptual analysis procedures, which undermined confidence in the merits of conceptual analysis. As far as the clarification of concepts is concerned, explication is therefore sometimes proposed as an alternative means. Combining historical and systematic perspectives, this volume collects new work on analytical and explicatory methods within 20th century philosophy. The contributions explore how clarificatory and reformatory methods of engaging with concepts have been construed and utilized by such different authors as Aristotle, Russell, Wittgenstein, Carnap or Mackie, marking out underappreciated congruencies and reevaluating historical disputes. They explore the role of analysis in metaphysics as well as metaethics and examine how methodological accounts relate to underlying ideas about concepts.
in Analysis and Explication in 20th Century Philosophy