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This paper argues that the duality of phantasia consists not in its being divided between two faculties, but in its being the meeting point of two representations. First it is argued that Plotinus’ theory, according to which the representation is a judgement, rests on his reading of Theaetetus 184c–187a and its criticism in De Anima III, 2–3. Second, it is argued that the ‘image’ in which the Plotinian representation consists follows the perceptual judgement instead of preceding it. Third, it is argued that there is neither a sub-sensitive faculty of phantasia nor a sub-sensitive representation. Then, the exteriority of the objects of representation with respect to the soul is discussed. Finally, an interpretation is proposed concerning the necessity for Plotinus to posit two representations of the same object.

In: History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis
In: Ancient Epistemology