This paper deals with Leibniz’s well-known reductio argument against the infinite number. I will show that while the argument is in itself valid, the assumption that Leibniz reduces to absurdity does not play a relevant role. The last paragraph of the paper reformulates the whole Leibnizian argument in plural terms (i.e. by means of a plural logic) to show that it is possible to derive the contradiction that Leibniz uses in his argument even in the absence of the premise that he refutes.

in History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis

This paper deals with Leibniz’s well - known reductio argument against the infinite number. I will show that while the argument is in itself valid, the assumption that Leibniz reduces to absurdity does not play a relevant role. The last paragraph of the paper reformulates the whole Leibnizian argument in plural terms (i.e. by means of a plural logic) to show that it is possible to derive the contradiction that Leibniz uses in his argument even in the absence of the premise that he refutes.

in Analysis and Explication in 20th Century Philosophy