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In: Anthropological Complementarism

By means of a two-level criterion for assenting or combination tests, a highly generic relation in the field of interpreted ordinary-language sentences which I suggest to call ‘linguistic (or: idiolectal) implication’ may be naturally split up into three subrelations, scil., ‘semantic (or: analytical) implication’, ‘pragmatic implication’, and ‘catapragmatic implication’, and two sub-subrelations, scil., ‘semantic presupposition’ and ‘catapragmatic presupposition’. Semantic implication is defined as the set-theoretical intersection of linguistic implication and strict implication or entailment and helps explicate the traditional concept of analyticity. Pragmatic implication comes very close to being a correlate of ‘Moore’s paradox’ and can serve as the basis for an integrated logic of believing and intending, which is useful for a further development of metaethics. Catapragmatic implication is less important but will none the less be mentioned for historical as well as systematic reasons. Semantic presupposition will be defined as a subcase of semantic implication. Choosing such a definition is, I take it, a prerequisite for vindicating Russell’s theory of definite descriptions, the philosophical fertility of which can hardly be overestimated. Catapragmatic presupposition neatly mirrors semantic presupposition but is of minor philosophical interest; hence it will only be touched in passing.

In: Anthropological Complementarism

In this essay, some efforts are made to work out, defend, and assess a position which seems to me to be highly relevant to important philosophical issues such as the question of whether dualistic and monistic (reductionist) solutions to the mindbody problem are acceptable, or whether a third (‘complementaristic’) way has to be looked for (sect. 0). What I am speaking of is the position that such strings of words as ‘Caesar is a prime number’ (Carnap’s example) and the peculiarly related ‘Caesar is identical to the number 3’ are, not false propositions, but nonsensical pseudo-propositions (sect. 1). I try to argue in favour of this position, first, by drawing an obvious consequence from two basic claims of Russell’s and Frege’s, respectively (sects. 2–6), and, second, by scrutinising the bounds of ‘Leibniz’s law’ as an alleged universal criterion for numerical (non-)identity (sect. 7). Finally, I seek to defend my result against a plausible objection (sect. 8) and to unearth the systematic ‘numerical’/‘categorial’ ambiguity of cross-category (non-)identity statements (sect. 9).

In: Anthropological Complementarism

In effect, Richard M. Hare proposes two different definitions of what he takes to be ‘entailment’ (sects. 1–2). If properly applied, both of them are promising indeed (sects. 3–5). At the same time, however, they capture on the one hand less andon the other hand more than ought to be expected of an entailment-relation (sects. 6–7). Moreover, either one fails to do justice to one or other formal criterion of adequacy to be postulated for a definition of entailment (sect. 8). The latter shortcoming can be overcome by merging Hare’s two definitions into one by way of stipulating a restriction of the domain on which to define the relation (sect. 9). Still, this relation is not yet entailment proper but a highly generic relation of ‘linguistic (or: idiolectal) implication’ (sect. 10). But it can be naturally split up into a number of philosophically fertile subrelations and sub-subrelations, which I will discuss in the following essay (opening sect. 0).

In: Anthropological Complementarism
In: Anthropological Complementarism
In: Anthropological Complementarism
In: Anthropological Complementarism
In: Anthropological Complementarism
In: Anthropological Complementarism

As for the body-mind-world relation, two pseudo-problems tend to impose themselves upon us (1). – The time-honoured mind-body pseudo-problem (1.1). – The mind-world pseudo-problem (1.2). – The body-consciousness-world problem as seen from the third- and the first-person perspectives (2). – The scientific body-consciousness- world problem(2.1). – The phenomenological body-consciousness-world problem. Changing philosophical amazement into insight (2.2). – Human action in the third- and the first-person perspectives (3). – The actions of others as seen frommy point of view. Overt behaviour (3.1). –My own actions as seen from my point of view. Gerundive features of my noematic phenomena (3.2). – Actions and intentions in action (3.3). – The complementarity of freedom and determinism in human action (3.4). – A plea for the coexistence of the two complementary perspectives (4). – Why the third-person perspective seems to be ‘the scientifically correct’ one (4.1). – However, the first- and the third-person perspectives do not contradict each other; so there is no question of a primacy among them (4.2). – We are in need of a novel conceptualisation of the phenomena of so-called ‘psychophysical interaction’ (5). – Perceiving and acting are no proper examples for an alleged psychophysical interaction (5.1). – The placebo effect. Views of some medical experts (5.2). – Subjective effects of placebo treatments (5.3). – Objective effects of placebo treatments (5.4) – Causation as a flux of energy versus Humean causation (5.5). – ‘Moore’s see-saw’. ‘The work of analysis and distinction is often very difficult’ (5.6). – The human and the divine points of view (6). – The origin of the world as seen from the human and the divine angles (6.1). – The world of science and our personal life-worlds (6.2).

In: Anthropological Complementarism