straightforward refutations of particular scientific definitions, rather than oppositions of arguments. Consequently, commentators have argued that the method deployed in M I – VI is not Pyrrhonianscepticism, but is rather negative dogmatism.
There seems, however, to be a plausible solution to this
approach or procedure, the skeptikē agōgē ( PH 1.4; cf. 1.6, 1.7, 1.11, 1.21, 1.22, etc.). 1 He places scepticism, at least his preferred Pyrrhonian variety, in the third, searching camp, with the Academics in the second ( PH 1.220–35), 2 along with the Cyrenaics ( PH 1.215) and the Empiricists ( PH
: Wesleyan University Press .
Hankinson , R.J. 1997 . The end of Scepticism . Kriterion 96 , 7 – 32 .
Hiley , D.R. 1987 . The Deep Challenge of PyrrhonianScepticism . Journal of the History of Philosophy 25 ( 2 ), 185 – 213 .
Ioli , R. 2003 . Agōgē and related
the problem James Hankinson investigates. Hankinson concludes that Sextus Empiricus and his branch of Skepticism can indeed inquire without having a method, or, at any rate, without having a method which would be problematic in the sense just mentioned.
Pyrrhonian inquiry, critics argue, aims at