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matters develop in different ways from how they were presented in Statesman - a fact that White thinks reinforces the idea that Statesman is largely aporetic. Myth, Metaphysics anti Dialedic in Plato s Statesman argues a clear and defensible point concerning the instructional role that this dialogue
"ührmittelstrategie . . . . . . . .. 346 SEAN McALEER: Friendship, Perception, and Referential Opacity in Nicomachean Ethics IX.9 ..................................... 362 Reviews - Rezensionen David A. White: Myth, Metaphysics anti Dialectic in Plato s "Statesman" (AUDREY L. ANroN) .............................. 375 George Kateb
democracies, and that is why democracy runs into problems. The alternative he proposes is epistocracy , the rule of the knowers: There is a whole variety of epistocratic models of government – from a rule of experts or philosopher kings, as in Plato’s Republic (Plato, 2000) – to a system of plural votes
. He doesn’t answer prayers, condemn people to hell, or send his son down to Earth to save humanity—not even close. Plato’s is a rational, philosophical panentheism. Importantly, Plato seems to add a subtle form of panpsychism to his panentheistic ontology. Scattered throughout his late works are
. He doesn’t answer prayers, condemn people to hell, or send his son down to Earth to save humanity—not even close. Plato’s is a rational, philosophical panentheism. Importantly, Plato seems to add a subtle form of panpsychism to his panentheistic ontology. Scattered throughout his late works are
feel so? Sure, it has something to do with the way we talk – but what? What – to borrow a metaphor from Plato’s Meno (97d) – is a logos like which can serve to peg the true judgement in this case so that it won’t run away like the very lifelike statues Daedalus made? These are good questions. And for
modern rational sciences. Unlike the 2 Roger B. Angel, Relativity: The Theory and its Philosophy (Oxford: Perg- amon Press, 1980) p. 26. Angel’s choice of words refers to Plato’s theory that reality is essentially of a timeless, ideal nature, but that it “appears” to us in an imperfect, confusing manner
not only ideas or contents, but also – and above all – the actions of the mind are an “object” of its contemplation. Locke’s understanding of reflection has a long hermeneutical history going back to Plato’s conception of the epistḗmē heautḗs ( ἐπιστήµη ἑαυτῆς ), 69 namely the knowledge that
proper names and with names for natural kinds. Since Frege and Russell, proper names have been held, like any singular term, to be substitutable via a description, for instance, »Aristotle« via »Alexander the Great’s teacher« or »Plato’s most famous student«.22 As is well known, Russell took up this
the Philosophy of Mind, Oxford 1994, 185–193. Rey, Georges: Concepts, in: Craig, Edward (Hrsg.): Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Band II, London 1998, 505–517. Rips, Lance J.: The Current Status of Research on Concept Combination, in: Mind and Language 10, 1995, 72–104. Robinson, Richard: Plato’s