straightforward refutations of particular scientific definitions, rather than oppositions of arguments. Consequently, commentators have argued that the method deployed in M I – VI is not Pyrrhonianscepticism, but is rather negative dogmatism.
There seems, however, to be a plausible solution to this
further back. T7 talks, in the technical language of Pyrrhonianscepticism, of an ‘equipollent dispute’, a dispute, that is, in which the considerations pro and con seem equally balanced, and hence there is no reason to opt for one alternative rather than the other. The dispute is anepikritos —at least
The issue in question involves Pyrrhonianskepticism and its connection to
Academic skepticism. The Pyrrhonians were the ancient skeptics who thought
that the late Academic skeptics took a step toward dogmatism when they followed
Philo against Clitomachus on the convincing impression, and
Armstrong, W. (ed.) 2004. PyrrhonianSkepticism. Oxford: Oxford UP.
Frede, M. 1984. The Sceptic’s Two Kinds of Assent and the Question of the Possibility
of Knowledge, in: Burnyeat, M. & Frede, M. (eds.) 1998. The Original Sceptics: A
Controversy. Indianapolis: Hackett.
Frede, M. 1989. The Sceptic’s Beliefs
: Wesleyan University Press .
Hankinson , R.J. 1997 . The end of Scepticism . Kriterion 96 , 7 – 32 .
Hiley , D.R. 1987 . The Deep Challenge of PyrrhonianScepticism . Journal of the History of Philosophy 25 ( 2 ), 185 – 213 .
Ioli , R. 2003 . Agōgē and related
. (ed.). PyrrhonianSkepticism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 99–117.
Wirrwitz, C. 2009. Die pyrrhonische Skepsis zwischen Alltagsuntauglichkeit und Selbstwi-
derspruch. Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy 12, 222–247.
Wittgenstein, L. 1921. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. In: Werkausgabe in 8
one on the Phaedo (48,7–11). 6 It is also possible to propose a range of dates for the composition of the commentary. The terminus post quem can be derived from the author’s familiarity with neo-Pyrrhonianskepticism, which did not receive widespread attention until after 45 BC , whereas the
Language of the Laërtian Pyrrhonist: Diog. Laert. 9.74–77. In: Vogt, K. M.
(ed.). PyrrhonianSkepticism in Diogenes Laertius. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 123–145.
Fine, G. 2010. Sceptical Inquiry. In: Charles D. (ed.). Denition in Greek Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford
Fine, G. 2011. Concepts and
Wittgenstein viewed philosophy as a personal therapeutic activity. A remark that
can inspire such a view is § 255. A related interpretation (e.g. Fogelin 1976; Stern 2004;
Plant 2004) sees in the Philosophical Investigations a defense and example of the methods
of Pyrrhonianskepticism. Part of § 133