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I HARE’S TWO DEFINITIONS OF ‘ENTAILMENT’ AND THE GENERIC RELATION OF ‘LINGUISTIC IMPLICATION’ Summary In effect, Richard M. Hare proposes two different definitions of what he takes to be ‘entailment’ (sects. 1–2). If properly applied, both of them are promising indeed (sects. 3–5). At the same time

In: Anthropological Complementarism
Author: Lucas Angioni

Aristotle's Definition of Scientific Knowledge (APo 71b 9-12) Lucas Angioni Abstract In Posterior Analytics 71b9-12, we find Aristotle's definition of scientific knowledge. The definiens is taken to have only two infonnative parts: scientific knowledge must be knowledge of the cause and its

In: Ancient Epistemology
Author: Petter Sandstad

Book Reviews Buchbesprechungen Michael T. Ferejohn: Fonnal Causes. Definition, Explanation, and Primacy in Socratic and Aristotelian Thought. Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press 2013. One of the more puzzling features of Aristotle's theoretical philosophy is his formal cause, the what

In: Ancient Epistemology

Stathis Psillos & Demetra Christopoulou THE A PRIORI: BETWEEN CONVENTIONS AND IMPLICIT DEFINITIONS* 1. Introduction A thumbnail sketch of the philosophical thinking about the a priori would surely include that it has been dominated by two major approaches: the Kantian absolute conception of it and

In: The A Priori and Its Role in Philosophy
Author: Volker Halbach

Volker Halbach PROLEGOMENA ZU EINER JEDEN KÜNFTIGEN DEFINITION VON WISSEN, DIE ALS LÖSUNG DES GETTIERPROBLEMS WIRD AUFTRETEN KÖNNEN ABSTRACT I investigate to what extent the Gettier problem can be generalized and used to refute the soundness of definitions of knowledge. To this end, I make

In: Von Rang und Namen

Definitions and Empirical Justification in Christian Wolff’s Theory of Science Katherine Dunlop, University of Texas at Austin Abstract This paper argues that in Christian Wolff’s theory of knowledge, logical regimentation does not take the place of experiential justification, but serves to

In: From Leibniz to Kant

In this paper, it is argued that there are relevant similarities between Aristotle’s account of definition and Carnap’s account of explication. To show this, first, Aristotle’s conditions of adequacy for definitions are provided and an outline of the main critique put forward against Aristotle’s account of definition is given. Subsequently, Carnap’s conditions of adequacy for explications are presented and discussed. It is shown that Aristotle’s conditions of extensional correctness can be interpreted against the backdrop of Carnap’s condition of similarity once one skips Aristotelian essentialism and takes a Carnapian and more pragmatic stance. Finally, it is argued that, in general, a complementary rational reconstruction of both approaches allows for resolving problems of interpretational underdetermination.

In: Analysis and Explication in 20th Century Philosophy

Book Reviews Buchbesprechungen Michael T. Ferejohn: Fonnal Causes. Definition, Explanation, and Primacy in Socratic and Aristotelian Thought. Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press 2013. One of the more puzzling features of Aristotle's theoretical philosophy is his formal cause, the what

In: Ancient Epistemology

on the one hand and the lifeworld on the other hand, to which problems of bioethics apply. The difference between types of experience in the scientific realm and in the lifeworld is reflected by the different definitions of nature they tend to favor. Against this background, I will claim that the

In: Human Nature and Self Design

3 Launehing the Tense Machine In this chapter, we introduce the three key notions of constitution, truth- making and Jact-content, lay down definitions and axioms involving them and derive further principles from these axioms and definitions. The definitions, axioms and derived principles will

In: As Time Goes By