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I HARE’S TWO DEFINITIONS OF ‘ENTAILMENT’ AND THE GENERIC RELATION OF ‘LINGUISTIC IMPLICATION’ Summary In effect, Richard M. Hare proposes two different definitions of what he takes to be ‘entailment’ (sects. 1–2). If properly applied, both of them are promising indeed (sects. 3–5). At the same time

In: Anthropological Complementarism
Author: Lucas Angioni

Aristotle's Definition of Scientific Knowledge (APo 71b 9-12) Lucas Angioni Abstract In Posterior Analytics 71b9-12, we find Aristotle's definition of scientific knowledge. The definiens is taken to have only two infonnative parts: scientific knowledge must be knowledge of the cause and its

In: Ancient Epistemology

In this paper, it is argued that there are relevant similarities between Aristotle’s account of definition and Carnap’s account of explication. To show this, first, Aristotle’s conditions of adequacy for definitions are provided and an outline of the main critique put forward against Aristotle’s account of definition is given. Subsequently, Carnap’s conditions of adequacy for explications are presented and discussed. It is shown that Aristotle’s conditions of extensional correctness can be interpreted against the backdrop of Carnap’s condition of similarity once one skips Aristotelian essentialism and takes a Carnapian and more pragmatic stance. Finally, it is argued that, in general, a complementary rational reconstruction of both approaches allows for resolving problems of interpretational underdetermination.

In: Analysis and Explication in 20th Century Philosophy
Author: Petter Sandstad

Book Reviews Buchbesprechungen Michael T. Ferejohn: Fonnal Causes. Definition, Explanation, and Primacy in Socratic and Aristotelian Thought. Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press 2013. One of the more puzzling features of Aristotle's theoretical philosophy is his formal cause, the what

In: Ancient Epistemology

Stathis Psillos & Demetra Christopoulou THE A PRIORI: BETWEEN CONVENTIONS AND IMPLICIT DEFINITIONS* 1. Introduction A thumbnail sketch of the philosophical thinking about the a priori would surely include that it has been dominated by two major approaches: the Kantian absolute conception of it and

In: The A Priori and Its Role in Philosophy

modal epistemology is therefore to provide a non-trivial, well-motivated, and revealing characterisation of the relevant set. The heuristic strategy for coping with this task is to give a constructive definition of knowledge in response to our intuitions. Prominent roles will be played by two

In: I know
Author: Edgar Morscher

.6. Auxiliary symbols of PFL: (, ) 2. Formation rules 0/ PFL (recursive definition 0/ /ormulas 0/ PFL): 2.1. If pn is an n-place predicate of PFL and Sb S2,"" Sn are singular symbols of PFL, then pnSlS2 .. 'Sn is a formula of PFL. 2.2. If S is a singular symbol of PFL, then E!s is a formula of PFL. 2.3. If

In: Reflections on Free Logic

thing< and >for at least one existing thing< (or >there exists something<). That explains why this understanding of quantification becomes part of the definition of free logic. Even if the main aim of free logic is to eliminate existential presuppositions with respect to singular terms, adefinition

In: Reflections on Free Logic

Lewis provides the following definition of knowledge: Subjeet S knows proposition p iff P holds in every possibility left uneliminated by S's evidenee; equivalently, iff S's evidenee eliminates every possibility in whieh not-po (Lewis 1996, p. 422) Later on, this definition is amended with a "sotto

In: I know

to deflationary accounts of the role of compositionality in determining theories of meaning (Horwich, 1997, 2001, 2005). The rest of the chapter will focus on the definition of the principle of syntactic compositionality, the description of systematicity, and why productivity is not a property of

In: Seeing Objects: The Structure of Visual Representation