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Assessing causal and moral responsibility for the things we fail to do
This book empirically investigates the social practice of ascribing moral responsibility to others for the things they failed to do, and it discusses the philosophical relevance of this practice. In our everyday life, we often blame others for things they failed to do. For instance, we might blame our neighbour for not watering our plants during our vacation. Interestingly, the attribution of blame is typically accompanied by the attribution of causal responsibility. We do not only blame our neighbour for not watering our plants, but we do so because we believe that not watering the plants caused them to dry up and die. In this book, I investigate how we make moral and causal judgments about omissions. I discuss different philosophical perspectives on this matter, and I outline to what extent the actual social practice is in line with philosophical theories.
AutorIn: Felicitas Selter

5.1 Behavioral Investigations of Anticipatory Planning in Animals 5.1.1 The Spoon Test Paradigm For a long time, empirical research has largely focused on anticipatory planning abilities, which can be attributed to a great part to the postulation of what would be come to known as the

in Planning for the Future
AutorIn: Felicitas Selter

, involves a behavioral output in most cases, and is empirically accessible, therefore. Planning also represents an important component of McMahan’s understanding of strong psychological unity, as became evident in chapter 3.3.2. An investigation of animal planning abilities is particularly well

in Planning for the Future
AutorIn: Felicitas Selter

capable of forming a particular kind of direct psychological connections into their futures. Planning lends itself to empirically investigate these internal reference-typed connections in animals. In chapter four, I will argue that planning and other related terms have loomed large in the debate around

in Planning for the Future
AutorIn: Roland Hesse

others in the pursuit of the good. Negative duties seem to have the same function: they specify types of action that we are not allowed to perform. Conceived in this way, the present project might be understood as investigating the question of whether there is a rationale for the idea that one is not

in Killing to Prevent Killings?
AutorIn: Felicitas Selter

’s interest in continuing to live greater than his dog’s. Unfortunately, a thus modified time-relative interest account raises many questions and problematic implications on its own, which would certainly be worth investigating in full detail at another time. The focus of this thesis, however, is on future

in Planning for the Future
AutorIn: Roland Hesse

to re-examine the course of the investigation and its conclusion so far. First, I will deal with a number of considerations that might be taken to imply that the whole project has been misguided from the very beginning (chapter 9). 144 Given that I will conclude that none of these considerations is

in Killing to Prevent Killings?
AutorIn: Felicitas Selter

the major positions concerning the ethics of killing animals. Almost needless to say, a proper investigation of our moral obligations towards animals cannot be done without mentioning two names, that is, Peter Singer and Tom Regan. Since its development in the 1970s, modern animal ethics has moved

in Planning for the Future

guaranteed energy density of gas to energy suppliers, the storage capacity of the natural gas system is limited. In Germany, for example, the limit is at 5 to 12 vol% (Sternberg & Bardow, 2015, p. 392). 158 Current research is therefore investigating further usage of hydrogen such as producing methane

in Climate Change and Individual Moral Duties

being in conflict? Gewirth has quite extensively investigated on this question (Gewirth, 1978, pp. 338–354). Implicitly, the applications of the PGC have touched upon all his considerations. The following is therefore a rather brief summary that intends to explicate the three implicitly assumed criteria

in Climate Change and Individual Moral Duties