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who finds him- or herself in the state of being stuck and at an impasse. Aristotle’s claim of the impossibility to unbind “a bond of which you are unaware” directly recalls Plato’s Meno 80a–d, where Meno and Socrates discuss the state of aporia they find themselves in when realizing neither has
of Knowledge. Against Relativism and Constructivism, Oxford 2006. Boghossian, P. A. (2006b): What is Relativism?. In: Truth and Realism, hg. von P. Greenough und M. Lynch. Oxford 2006, S. 13-37. Bostock, D.: Plato’s Theaetetus, Oxford 1988. Brewer, S.: Scientific Expert Testimony and
agnooumenês autês agnoeisthai kai tên phusin, 200b12–15). Aristotle rejects Plato’s view that motion is caused by an intelligible soul (cf. Phaedrus, 245c–246a); that is, the sensible world does not require an intelligible (non-sensible) principle in order to exist orderly and coherently. Nature is about
agnooumenês autês agnoeisthai kai tên phusin, 200b12–15). Aristotle rejects Plato’s view that motion is caused by an intelligible soul (cf. Phaedrus, 245c–246a); that is, the sensible world does not require an intelligible (non-sensible) principle in order to exist orderly and coherently. Nature is about
harmed either in life or in death.9 Bibliography Austin, E. 2010. Prudence and the Fear of Death in Plato’s Apology. Ancient Philosophy 30, 39–55. Benson H. 1990. The Priority of Denition and the Socratic Elenchus. Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 8, 19–65. Gerson, L. 2009. Ancient Epistemology. New
with Plato’s world of Ideas. Frege, accordingly, is a logical realist. A consequence of his system of thought is that there is only room for true and false truth-values: “Under a truth-value of a statement I understand the circumstance under which it is true or false. Other truth-values don’t exist
as possible, and nevertheless accomplished a poor argument (161b5–8): we get a taste of such dialectical meltdown in Plato’s Gorgias. On the other hand, it is the mark of a good (i.e. co-operative) interlocutor to grant things which may undermine his thesis – so long as they seem acceptable, or more
, illumination, or touch. Does this show more than Plato’s preference for optic and haptic metaphors? Should we assume that this goes back to a specific reason to be found in his underlying epistemological position? On the traditional reading, Plato actually wants to defend a sort of intuitionism. According to
in particulars” would seem to give rise to something like Plato’s Third Man. Socrates instantiating Human would again be an existential moment, which in turn would instantiate the mode ‘being thus-and-so’. But then, wouldn’t the existential moment ‘‘Socrates instantiating Human’ instantiating the
–406). Irwin’s thought is that this could not be so if acting virtuously merely led causally to wellbeing, or if the former is desired as a means to the latter rather than as a “part” of it. Irwin also uses the same idea in Plato’s Moral Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), pp. 254–259, 341, to interpret