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Author: Benjamin Wilck

about which the Sceptic cannot suspend belief. Specifically, I suggest that there is one kind of belief that seems to defy the sceptical method, namely scientific definitions. In the Outlines of Scepticism (= PH ), Sextus Empiricus defines his sceptical method as an ability to suspend belief

Open Access
In: History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis
Author: Lucas Angioni

In Posterior Analytics 71b9–12, we find Aristotle’s definition of scientific knowledge. The definiens is taken to have only two informative parts: scientific knowledge must be knowledge of the cause and its object must be necessary. However, there is also a contrast between the definiendum and a sophistic way of knowing, which is marked by the expression “kata sumbebekos”. Not much attention has been paid to this contrast. In this paper, I discuss Aristotle’s definition paying due attention to this contrast and to the way it interacts with the two conditions presented in the definiens. I claim that the “necessity” condition ammounts to explanatory appropriateness of the cause.

In: History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis

Definitions and Empirical Justification in Christian Wolff’s Theory of Science Katherine Dunlop, University of Texas at Austin Abstract This paper argues that in Christian Wolff’s theory of knowledge, logical regimentation does not take the place of experiential justification, but serves to

In: History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis
Author: Boris Hennig

definition of a natural thing. Since Aristotle seems to firmly deny that the matter of a substance is part of its essence, I will consider the following three options. First, there might be definitions of compounds, which specify more than the essence of a thing, namely also its matter. Second, one might

In: History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis
Author: Ralf Busse

its own right. 2 In section (2) I will start with an overview of §8. In section (3) I will highlight Rodriguez-Pereyra’s two interpretative achievements, first, the observation that Leibniz infers CCS not from CCT alone but from CCT plus the Aristotelian ‘nominal’ definition of substance ADS

In: History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis
Author: Benjamin Wilck

principles (definitions, postulates, common notions), the Elements seems to be a purely mathematical treatise. In the present paper, however, I show that the Elements also conveys a metaphysical theory of mathematical objects. Specifically, I argue that Euclid promotes elaborate metaphysical distinctions

Open Access
In: History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis

A Complementary Approach to Aristotle’s Account and Carnap’s Account of Explication Christian J. Feldbacher - Escamilla, Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf Abstract In this paper, it is argued that there are relevant similarities between Aristotle’s account of definition and Carnap

In: History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis

breadth of this consensus, one might naturally assume that there is a definition of his idealism that enjoys the status of a standard and also distinguishes his position from nearby competitors. In this paper, we argue that the prevailing definitions of Berkeley’s idealism fail to explicitly rule out a

In: History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis

reading, he defines (A1) ‘impression’ as ‘forceful perception’, and (A2) ‘idea’ as ‘faint perception’ 2 As is the case with definitions, (A1) entails that (i) a perception is an impression ↔ it is a forceful perception, while (A2) entails that (ii) a perception is an idea ↔ it is a

In: History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis