straightforward refutations of particular scientific definitions, rather than oppositions of arguments. Consequently, commentators have argued that the method deployed in M I – VI is not Pyrrhonianscepticism, but is rather negative dogmatism.
There seems, however, to be a plausible solution to this
further back. T7 talks, in the technical language of Pyrrhonianscepticism, of an ‘equipollent dispute’, a dispute, that is, in which the considerations pro and con seem equally balanced, and hence there is no reason to opt for one alternative rather than the other. The dispute is anepikritos —at least
: Wesleyan University Press .
Hankinson , R.J. 1997 . The end of Scepticism . Kriterion 96 , 7 – 32 .
Hiley , D.R. 1987 . The Deep Challenge of PyrrhonianScepticism . Journal of the History of Philosophy 25 ( 2 ), 185 – 213 .
Ioli , R. 2003 . Agōgē and related