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straightforward refutations of particular scientific definitions, rather than oppositions of arguments. Consequently, commentators have argued that the method deployed in M I – VI is not Pyrrhonian scepticism, but is rather negative dogmatism. There seems, however, to be a plausible solution to this
approach or procedure, the skeptikē agōgē ( PH 1.4; cf. 1.6, 1.7, 1.11, 1.21, 1.22, etc.). 1 He places scepticism, at least his preferred Pyrrhonian variety, in the third, searching camp, with the Academics in the second ( PH 1.220–35), 2 along with the Cyrenaics ( PH 1.215) and the Empiricists ( PH
: Wesleyan University Press . Hankinson , R.J. 1997 . The end of Scepticism . Kriterion 96 , 7 – 32 . Hiley , D.R. 1987 . The Deep Challenge of Pyrrhonian Scepticism . Journal of the History of Philosophy 25 ( 2 ), 185 – 213 . Ioli , R. 2003 . Agōgē and related
.M. (ed.), Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius . Tübingen : Mohr Siebeck , 147 – 170 . Palmer , J. 2000 . Skeptical Investigation . Ancient Philosophy 20 ( 2 ), 351 – 375 . Perin , C. 2010 . The Demands of Reason: An Essay on Pyrrhonian Scepticism . Oxford
the problem James Hankinson investigates. Hankinson concludes that Sextus Empiricus and his branch of Skepticism can indeed inquire without having a method, or, at any rate, without having a method which would be problematic in the sense just mentioned. Pyrrhonian inquiry, critics argue, aims at