a series of truths—even metaphysical (the principle of non-contradiction or causality) and moral (do good and avoid evil) — immediately or in a pre-scientific way. Pre-scientific knowledge can be manifested through other channels that are also a source of truth for people, such as art, literature or
no objective reason for sacrificing the dog, i.e. acknowledging that we are indeed biased in choosing the dog, but simultaneously argue that we have a moral duty to do so, anyway. This does not need to be a contradiction if moral reasons are allowed to be derived from two different sources. Most of
. On the usual definition of disjunction, and on the assumption that bivalence holds, then, both › Pa ‹ and › ¬ Pa ‹ are false, and their respective negations true—but › ¬ Pa ∧ ¬¬ Pa ‹ is a contradiction. Since Russell holds that vagueness ›infects‹ not only ordinary language, but—albeit to a lesser
beautiful monkey is ugly when compared with a human (B82), and the most beautiful or wise human when compared with a god with regard to beauty or wisdom, etc. (B83).
Heraclitus, in his own aporetic mode, confronts us with apparent contradictions, which are resolved by a recognition of what is common
status of an appearance, since, as Kant observed, it would be a contradiction to say that God is a creator of appearances. 6 For appearances, what is relevant are the activities of the epistemic subject. A theistic explanation (as Fichte often emphasized) is not compatible with a Kantian approach. This
contradiction. This paper is going to pursue the following question: Could it nevertheless be the case that there is a metaphysical connection between panpsychism and panentheism?
This question brings to mind what might be a parallel case, famously argued for by Saul Kripke 2 : Before the advent of modern
, in direct contradiction to the Tractatus , “The world is the totality of things, not of facts.” 28 Only events and things are valid as parts of the world.
The main points of Strawson’s remarks are: facts are not parts of the world, they cannot act as truth maker for statements; they are not the
, Marxist-Leninists and Stalinists are in contradiction with Kant’s moral philosophy. The categorical imperative of Kant states that »So act that you use humanity, in your own person as well as in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means«. 30 According to the
possible divine intervention preventing them from meeting: »For if God impresses motion upon matter, as you have shown earlier, can he not press against it, preventing the sides of the vessel from meeting? However, it is a contradiction to say, you argue, that the sides of a vessel are distant from one
loudly. Yet, they can be expressed linguistically as implicit judgements (Gewirth, 1978, pp. 42–43). The prospective agent must make these judgements as a “rational agent” (Gewirth, 1978, p. 46). Rational in the “minimal deductive” sense “involving consistency or the avoidance of self-contradiction in