Search Results
about which the Sceptic cannot suspend belief. Specifically, I suggest that there is one kind of belief that seems to defy the sceptical method, namely scientific definitions. In the Outlines of Scepticism (= PH ), Sextus Empiricus defines his sceptical method as an ability to suspend belief
In effect, Richard M. Hare proposes two different definitions of what he takes to be ‘entailment’ (sects. 1–2). If properly applied, both of them are promising indeed (sects. 3–5). At the same time, however, they capture on the one hand less andon the other hand more than ought to be expected of an entailment-relation (sects. 6–7). Moreover, either one fails to do justice to one or other formal criterion of adequacy to be postulated for a definition of entailment (sect. 8). The latter shortcoming can be overcome by merging Hare’s two definitions into one by way of stipulating a restriction of the domain on which to define the relation (sect. 9). Still, this relation is not yet entailment proper but a highly generic relation of ‘linguistic (or: idiolectal) implication’ (sect. 10). But it can be naturally split up into a number of philosophically fertile subrelations and sub-subrelations, which I will discuss in the following essay (opening sect. 0).
In this paper, it is argued that there are relevant similarities between Aristotle’s account of definition and Carnap’s account of explication. To show this, first, Aristotle’s conditions of adequacy for definitions are provided and an outline of the main critique put forward against Aristotle’s account of definition is given. Subsequently, Carnap’s conditions of adequacy for explications are presented and discussed. It is shown that Aristotle’s conditions of extensional correctness can be interpreted against the backdrop of Carnap’s condition of similarity once one skips Aristotelian essentialism and takes a Carnapian and more pragmatic stance. Finally, it is argued that, in general, a complementary rational reconstruction of both approaches allows for resolving problems of interpretational underdetermination.
By means of a two-level criterion for assenting or combination tests, a highly generic relation in the field of interpreted ordinary-language sentences which I suggest to call ‘linguistic (or: idiolectal) implication’ may be naturally split up into three subrelations, scil., ‘semantic (or: analytical) implication’, ‘pragmatic implication’, and ‘catapragmatic implication’, and two sub-subrelations, scil., ‘semantic presupposition’ and ‘catapragmatic presupposition’. Semantic implication is defined as the set-theoretical intersection of linguistic implication and strict implication or entailment and helps explicate the traditional concept of analyticity. Pragmatic implication comes very close to being a correlate of ‘Moore’s paradox’ and can serve as the basis for an integrated logic of believing and intending, which is useful for a further development of metaethics. Catapragmatic implication is less important but will none the less be mentioned for historical as well as systematic reasons. Semantic presupposition will be defined as a subcase of semantic implication. Choosing such a definition is, I take it, a prerequisite for vindicating Russell’s theory of definite descriptions, the philosophical fertility of which can hardly be overestimated. Catapragmatic presupposition neatly mirrors semantic presupposition but is of minor philosophical interest; hence it will only be touched in passing.