about which the Sceptic cannot suspend belief. Specifically, I suggest that there is one kind of belief that seems to defy the sceptical method, namely scientific definitions.
In the Outlines of Scepticism (= PH ), Sextus Empiricus defines his sceptical method as an ability to suspend belief
In effect, Richard M. Hare proposes two different definitions of what he takes to be ‘entailment’ (sects. 1–2). If properly applied, both of them are promising indeed (sects. 3–5). At the same time, however, they capture on the one hand less andon the other hand more than ought to be expected of an entailment-relation (sects. 6–7). Moreover, either one fails to do justice to one or other formal criterion of adequacy to be postulated for a definition of entailment (sect. 8). The latter shortcoming can be overcome by merging Hare’s two definitions into one by way of stipulating a restriction of the domain on which to define the relation (sect. 9). Still, this relation is not yet entailment proper but a highly generic relation of ‘linguistic (or: idiolectal) implication’ (sect. 10). But it can be naturally split up into a number of philosophically fertile subrelations and sub-subrelations, which I will discuss in the following essay (opening sect. 0).
zurück zu Bandübersicht - Erkenntnistheorie - Logik In gewisser Weise ist S(⊨) bereits die ganze Logik. Denn die logischen Partikel können nun durch Definition auf der Implikationsrelation eingeführt werden. Allerdings handelt es sich hier nicht um übliche explizite Definitionen, sondern um