contradictions in the text. What some may argue is the result of the interpolation of two different texts or others may argue is a merely apparent contradiction that must be rendered consistent by any acceptable interpretation may simply be an example of Aristotle deliberately revising or rejecting what he had
In his ‘Outlines of Pyrrhonism’ Sextus Empiricus compares the Pyrrhonean arguments with a purge, which forces the subject to give up both the philosophical beliefs and the Pyrrhonean arguments. It is shown that this strategy leads to serious troubles: Insofar the Pyrrhonean arguments are at least partly philosophical in nature, they lead to a contradiction in the subject’s beliefs about his own beliefs. But this does not help the Pyrrhonist to reach his goal: On the one hand, facing a contradiction, some, but not all beliefs of a given discourse should be given up. On the other hand, the contradiction is not avoidable: In this respect, the metaphor of a “purge” is misleading: The presupposed timely dimension (first philosophy is given up, then Pyrrhonism) has no counterpart in logical reasoning.
Scholars often assert that Plato and Aristotle share the view that discursive thought (dianoia) is internal speech (TIS). However, there has been little work to clarify or substantiate this reading. In this paper I show Plato and Aristotle share some core commitments about the relationship of thought and speech, but cash out TIS in different ways. Plato and Aristotle both hold that discursive thinking is a process that moves from a set of doxastic states to a final doxastic state. The resulting judgments (doxai) can be true or false. Norms govern these final judgments and, in virtue of that, they govern the process that arrives at those judgments. The principal norm is consistency. However, the philosophers differ on the source of this norm. For Plato, persuasiveness and accuracy ground non-contradiction because internal speech is dialogical. For Aristotle, the Principle of Non-Contradiction grounds a Doxastic Thesis (DT) that no judgment can contradict itself. For Aristotle, metaphysics grounds non-contradiction because internal speech is monological.
This paper deals with Leibniz’s well-known reductio argument against the infinite number. I will show that while the argument is in itself valid, the assumption that Leibniz reduces to absurdity does not play a relevant role. The last paragraph of the paper reformulates the whole Leibnizian argument in plural terms (i.e. by means of a plural logic) to show that it is possible to derive the contradiction that Leibniz uses in his argument even in the absence of the premise that he refutes.
This paper offers a novel solution to the long-standing puzzle of why the Canon of Pure Reason maintains, in contradiction to Kant’s position elsewhere in the first Critique, both that practical freedom can be proved through experience, and that the question of our transcendental freedom is properly bracketed as irrelevant in practical matters. The Canon is an a priori investigation of our most fundamental practical capacity. It is argued that Kant intends its starting point to be explanatorily independent of transcendental logic and the ontic more generally, an independence that would be compromised if transcendental freedom were included in that starting point, even in a mode of supposition. In a different sense, however, practical reason precisely is dependent on the ontic: it can be realized only in beings. This species of dependence is used to explain the puzzling claim that practical freedom can be experienced.
reasoning need not stop there. In our initial encounter with the Liar we recognize that the expression ‘true’ leads to contradiction. To establish this we go on to use that very expression again. Simmons call this step repetition (11). Our next step is rehabilitation . Here, we reason that we are able to
the one and only means by which one may arrive at the thinking of, certain Forms (here the Form of the quality, equal ). There appears to be a tension, or contradiction, between the two claims. Certainly, there appears to be a contradiction, if the earlier claim is understood as meaning or implying
subject, Rodriguez-Pereyra (2015, 149) infers that Leibniz’s worry concerning the merely nominal Aristotelian definition is “that the idea of true predication or attribution might conceal a contradiction or impossibility”, and he diagnoses that with CCT Leibniz “has done nothing to show that there is no
criticizes other interpreters of the Parmenides for either ignoring these connections or failing to explain them adequately. She suggests that Plato is borrowing Gorgias’ method and reinforcing a Gorgianic criticism of Eleaticism, that it inherently leads to contradictions (Brémond 2019, 97–99). But I