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Author: Justin Vlasits

1 Introduction The Pyrrhonian skeptics occupy a paradoxical place in the history of “philosophical inquiry”. On the one hand, they are the only school that self-consciously defined themselves as inquirers, this being, of course, the root meaning of skeptikos . 1 Moreover, they developed

In: History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis
Author: R.J. Hankinson

with differences—or so at least I believe, and intend to show. 2 The Starting-Point of Scepticism Sceptics start out their inquiries with the same motivations as everyone else. They are puzzled by “the inconcinnity in things” ( ē tōn pragmatōn anōmalia ), and seek to resolve these

In: History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis
Author: Vasilis Politis

1 Introduction What is the relation, in Plato, between the account of knowledge and the account of inquiry? Is the account of knowledge independent of the account of inquiry? Taking up this question is a large task, not least because, while so much work has been done on Plato’s account of

In: History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis
Author: Keith Begley

early thinkers addressed epistemic questions but never conceptualized them as, therefore failed to thematize them into, a distinct subject of enquiry. […] there is no Presocratic instance of critical appraisal of an argument or a theory, or of a self-criticism. [….] But, even if we admit that the early

In: History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis

1 The Importance of Inquiry for Understanding (Ancient) Philosophy At least since Socrates, philosophy has been understood as the desire for acquiring a special kind of knowledge, namely wisdom, a kind of knowledge that human beings ordinarily do not possess. According to ancient thinkers

In: History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis
An Enquiry into Relevance and Validity
Author: Dirk Hartmann
The purpose of teaching logic in philosophy is to enable us to evaluate arguments with respect to (formal) validity. Standard logics refer to a concept of validity which allows for the relation of implication to hold between premises and conclusion even in cases where there is no “relevant” connection between the premises and the conclusion. A prominent example for this is the rule “Ex-Falso-Quodlibet” (EFQ), which allows us to infer an arbitrary proposition from a contradiction. The tolerance of irrelevance endorsed by standard logics unfortunately engenders that they cannot adequately fulfill their intended task of analyzing and evaluating philosophical, scientific and everyday-life arguments – instead, their application even gives rise to a multitude of artificial philosophical pseudoproblems (like the problem of the disposition predicates or the problem of counterfactuals). As alternatives to standard logics, there exist non-standard systems called “relevance logics” or “relevant logics” meant to avoid irrelevance. The problem with these systems, however, is that the mainstream relational semantics (“worlds semantics”) available for them is to be considered unintuitive and complex to a degree which is apt to render relevant logics unattractive to the majority of philosophers who are on the lookout not only for adequate, but also simple and efficient technical means for evaluating arguments. Therefore, the main aim of this treatise is to provide an alternative semantics (“rules semantics”) which is comparatively easy to grasp and simple in application. A second aim of the book is to extend the semantics as least as far as it takes to cover more or less all the logical notions philosophers need in their “everyday analyzing”. This includes first order predicate logic, higher order logic (for analyzing talk about “properties” etc.), identity, definite descriptions, abstraction principles and modal logic. This book can be read without having any more background than a good introductory course in classical logic provides.
Author: Asher Jiang

wichtiges Beispiel dazu. In Kapitel 4 in Enquiry , wo Hume für seine berühmte skeptische These argumentiert, der zufolge die Zuverlässigkeit unserer induktiven Schlüsse sich nicht rational rechtfertigen lässt, räumt er explizit ein, dass jene Kraft, mit deren Hilfe ein Objekt (genauer: ein Ereignis, in dem

In: Vom Phänomenalen zum Gedanklichen
Author: Asher Jiang

komplexen Idee aufzuzählen. Im siebten Kapitel von Humes Enquiry findet sich eine sehr ähnliche Formulierung: »Complex ideas may, perhaps, be well known by definition, which is nothing but an enumeration of those parts or simple ideas, that compose them«. 20 Die Ähnlichkeit zwischen den beiden Zitaten

In: Vom Phänomenalen zum Gedanklichen
Fichtes System als Weg der kommunikativen Wissensbildung
Dieses Buch ist eine analytisch-sprachkritisch ausgerichtete Untersuchung von Johann Gottlieb Fichtes Wissenschaftslehre in ihrer Entwicklung bis ca. 1800, welche diese als ein einem universalen Bildungsideal verpflichtetes System der Begründung und Vermittlung philosophischen Wissens rekonstruiert.
In systematischer Absicht wird hier eine Interpretation der Wissenschaftslehre entwickelt, durch welche grundlegende Teile von Fichtes Projekt methodisch nachvollziehbar gemacht werden. Besonderes Augenmerk liegt dabei auf der Analyse derjenigen Systemstellen, an welchen der Begriff der Aufforderung bzw. Kommunikation ins Zentrum rückt; diese sind namentlich Fichtes Überlegungen zum Sprachursprung in der Schrift Von der Sprachfähigkeit (1795) und sein Aufforderungsargument in der Grundlage des Naturrechts (1796/97).
Author: Asher Jiang

begrifflichen Denkens mit dem Aufbringen von Ideen findet sich in einer Fußnote in Enquiry , wo Hume sich über die unübersichtliche Mehrdeutigkeit des Terms »idea« bei Locke beschwert. Aus dem Zitat geht nämlich deutlich hervor, dass Hume gedachte Gedanken (»thoughts«) und Perzeptionen (»perceptions

In: Vom Phänomenalen zum Gedanklichen