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about which the Sceptic cannot suspend belief. Specifically, I suggest that there is one kind of belief that seems to defy the sceptical method, namely scientific definitions. In the Outlines of Scepticism (= PH ), Sextus Empiricus defines his sceptical method as an ability to suspend belief
In Posterior Analytics 71b9–12, we find Aristotle’s definition of scientific knowledge. The definiens is taken to have only two informative parts: scientific knowledge must be knowledge of the cause and its object must be necessary. However, there is also a contrast between the definiendum and a sophistic way of knowing, which is marked by the expression “kata sumbebekos”. Not much attention has been paid to this contrast. In this paper, I discuss Aristotle’s definition paying due attention to this contrast and to the way it interacts with the two conditions presented in the definiens. I claim that the “necessity” condition ammounts to explanatory appropriateness of the cause.
definition of a natural thing. Since Aristotle seems to firmly deny that the matter of a substance is part of its essence, I will consider the following three options. First, there might be definitions of compounds, which specify more than the essence of a thing, namely also its matter. Second, one might
principles (definitions, postulates, common notions), the Elements seems to be a purely mathematical treatise. In the present paper, however, I show that the Elements also conveys a metaphysical theory of mathematical objects. Specifically, I argue that Euclid promotes elaborate metaphysical distinctions
its own right. 2 In section (2) I will start with an overview of §8. In section (3) I will highlight Rodriguez-Pereyra’s two interpretative achievements, first, the observation that Leibniz infers CCS not from CCT alone but from CCT plus the Aristotelian ‘nominal’ definition of substance ADS
This paper argues that in Christian Wolff’s theory of knowledge, logical regimentation does not take the place of experiential justification, but serves to facilitate the application of empirical information and clearly exhibit its warrant. My argument targets rationalistic interpretations such as R. Lanier Anderson’s. It is common ground in this dispute that making concepts “distinct” (articulating their component marks) issues in the premises on which all deductive justification rests. Against the view that concepts are made distinct only by analysis, which is carried out by the understanding independently of experience, I contend that for Wolff some distinct concepts are arrived at through experience. I emphasize that Wolff countenances empirical methods of obtaining distinct concepts even in mathematics. This striking feature of his view indicates how its empiricist elements can be reconciled with his injunction to follow “mathematical” method.