about which the Sceptic cannot suspend belief. Specifically, I suggest that there is one kind of belief that seems to defy the sceptical method, namely scientific definitions.
In the Outlines of Scepticism (= PH ), Sextus Empiricus defines his sceptical method as an ability to suspend belief
In Posterior Analytics 71b9–12, we find Aristotle’s definition of scientific knowledge. The definiens is taken to have only two informative parts: scientific knowledge must be knowledge of the cause and its object must be necessary. However, there is also a contrast between the definiendum and a sophistic way of knowing, which is marked by the expression “kata sumbebekos”. Not much attention has been paid to this contrast. In this paper, I discuss Aristotle’s definition paying due attention to this contrast and to the way it interacts with the two conditions presented in the definiens. I claim that the “necessity” condition ammounts to explanatory appropriateness of the cause.
definition of a natural thing. Since Aristotle seems to firmly deny that the matter of a substance is part of its essence, I will consider the following three options. First, there might be definitions of compounds, which specify more than the essence of a thing, namely also its matter. Second, one might
principles (definitions, postulates, common notions), the Elements seems to be a purely mathematical treatise. In the present paper, however, I show that the Elements also conveys a metaphysical theory of mathematical objects. Specifically, I argue that Euclid promotes elaborate metaphysical distinctions
its own right. 2
In section (2) I will start with an overview of §8. In section (3) I will highlight Rodriguez-Pereyra’s two interpretative achievements, first, the observation that Leibniz infers CCS not from CCT alone but from CCT plus the Aristotelian ‘nominal’ definition of substance ADS
This paper argues that in Christian Wolff’s theory of knowledge, logical regimentation does not take the place of experiential justification, but serves to facilitate the application of empirical information and clearly exhibit its warrant. My argument targets rationalistic interpretations such as R. Lanier Anderson’s. It is common ground in this dispute that making concepts “distinct” (articulating their component marks) issues in the premises on which all deductive justification rests. Against the view that concepts are made distinct only by analysis, which is carried out by the understanding independently of experience, I contend that for Wolff some distinct concepts are arrived at through experience. I emphasize that Wolff countenances empirical methods of obtaining distinct concepts even in mathematics. This striking feature of his view indicates how its empiricist elements can be reconciled with his injunction to follow “mathematical” method.
In this paper, it is argued that there are relevant similarities between Aristotle’s account of definition and Carnap’s account of explication. To show this, first, Aristotle’s conditions of adequacy for definitions are provided and an outline of the main critique put forward against Aristotle’s account of definition is given. Subsequently, Carnap’s conditions of adequacy for explications are presented and discussed. It is shown that Aristotle’s conditions of extensional correctness can be interpreted against the backdrop of Carnap’s condition of similarity once one skips Aristotelian essentialism and takes a Carnapian and more pragmatic stance. Finally, it is argued that, in general, a complementary rational reconstruction of both approaches allows for resolving problems of interpretational underdetermination.
This paper poses a problem with respect to Husserl’s concept of evidence in The Idea of Phenomenology. In the beginning, Husserl approaches phenomenology as theory of knowledge, focuses on the essence of knowledge, and defines it in terms of evidence. In the middle, he shifts his attention to the definition of evidence as “self-givenness” but gets carried away by the search for a preferred kind of evidence, namely, the evidence of essences. In the end, he remains preoccupied with eidetic knowledge and describes “evidence in the pregnant sense” as absolute, adequate, and apodictic “self-givenness”. The paper shows that these developments have serious consequences for an interpretation of The Idea of Phenomenology as a reliable introduction to Husserl’s phenomenological epistemology and important implications for the phenomenology of evidence beyond this work.
John Carriero has argued that for Spinoza there is no final causality in the Aristotelian sense and that the striving of things is merely to be understood in terms of metaphysical inertia. This paper makes a case against this claim. First it is argued that Spinoza’s notion of striving does in principle meet Thomas Aquinas’ criterion for final causation. Second it is shown that Carriero’s denial of final causation in Spinoza leads to a deflationary interpretation of Spinoza’s notions of the good and striving of things, which is at odds with many passages of Spinoza’s Ethics. One can only do justice to these passages if one assumes that Spinoza did accept final causation in the traditional sense.
John Carriero argumentierte, dass Spinoza keine finale Kausalität im aristotelischen Sinne vertrete, sondern das Streben von Dingen als Ausdruck einer Art metaphysischen Trägheit verstehe. Dagegen, so wird hier ausgeführt, sprechen zwei Gründe: Erstens genügt Spinozas Charakterisierung des Strebens von Dingen prinzipiell Thomas von Aquins Definition finaler Verursachung. Zweitens führt Carrieros Zurückweisung finaler Verursachung zu einer deflationären Lesart von Spinozas Begriffen des Guten und des Strebens von Dingen, die mit vielen Passagen aus Spinozas Ethik unvereinbar sind. Diesen Passagen kann nur Rechnung getragen werden, wenn man annimmt, dass Spinoza finale Verursachung im traditionellen Sinn akzeptierte.