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simply demolish his opponents’ views. Instead, the Sceptic sets up oppositions of equally convincing arguments for conflicting conclusions so as to induce a suspension of belief, as defined in Sextus’ major work, the Outlines of Scepticism : (8) Scepticism is an ability to set out oppositions
better-off than the dogmatist, due to the results that suspension brings in two distinct domains of human existence ( PH I.25). First, concerning the distress ( tarachē ) that arises merely because of rashly accepted beliefs, one who does not accept those beliefs is in a better position than another who
what the Sceptic’s way of life is designed to avoid.” 3 The way that this objection is normally formulated, the question is whether it is possible for a Pyrrhonian to inquire at all, given their suspension of judgement and argumentative techniques. Sextus directly answers a version of this objection
another, 3 or whether the sceptic can have beliefs, and if so of what sort. 4 What I am concerned with is whether they can legitimately be said to have a method, and if so whether it is the sort of thing sceptics can properly ascribe to themselves: how if at all one could claim, without overbalancing