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determined by the intrinsic values of the episodes of pleasure and pain contained in that life, in such a way that one life is intrinsically better than another if and only if the net amount of pleasure in the one is greater than the net amount of pleasure in the other. (Italics removed; Feldman 2004, p

In: Radical Life Extension
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not a real-life situation relevant to the survival of the individual, but a mental model generated by the cognitive processing of the text. This does not mean, however, that the reader’s feelings are not real, as was assumed for a long time, before the cognitive turn. The reader displays many of the

In: Negative Emotions in the Reception of Fictional Narratives

badness of any particular death will be determined by [i] the quantity and quality of the future goods (minus future evils) that the individual’s life would otherwise have contained, though [ii] the badness of the loss of each future good through death must be weighted for the degree to which the

In: Planning for the Future
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foot back as areaction to it. By this, the negative condition impairing the organism comes to an end and the pain ceases. This is an example of a fast reflexive and standard reaction tied to basic survival needs. A central property of feit body-states is that the automatie reflex reaction is a

In: Emotions Hold the Self Together
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exactly the same objection holds true in the case of the duration hedonist: if life B is miserable as is life A, it can nevertheless be an improvement as long as it contains certain longer episodes of pleasure that are contained in life A or as long as it is itself longer than life A - which it is by

In: Radical Life Extension

has developed in the scientific milieu in the course of history. To this aim, we will answer the following guiding questions: What do theories do and how they do it? To answer these questions beforehand, I might assert the following: theories explain, providing orientation by means of a text of a

In: How? Enarrativity and the Cognition of Explicative Thinking

by means of which my belief becomes a conscious one. If HOT amounts to saying that a conscious episode of belief such as assenting to p consists in entertaining a belief that one believes that p, conscious Moorean beliefs will involve having contradictory beliefs (»I believe that p« (unconscious

In: Self-knowledge and Self-deception

toward the object-occurrence field. It will be still enraptured as affected by the objects and occurrences of its surroundings, behaving instinctively in the effectivity (teleonomy) of the own individual, as well as of the species-specific viability and survival. However, the human being has achieved the

In: How? Enarrativity and the Cognition of Explicative Thinking
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beyond a certain degree, self-consciousness, or sociability, or the genetic potential to develop them, but can still be regarded as human beings since they might have other properties also belonging to the cluster, such as being born by a human being, looking like a human being, or being genetically

In: Radical Life Extension
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one way or another. Most of them 1 represent the world in a certain manner but do not tell us how we want the world to be or which things matter to us and, hence, by themselves give us no reason to interact with the world. So, first-person thoughts also need to involve some motivational component

In: First-Person Thought