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Author: Robert Bolton

Dialectic, Peirastic and Scientific Method in Aristotle’s Sophistical Refutations Robert Bolton, Rutgers University Abstract In Metaphysics IV.2 Aristotle assigns a very specific role to dialectic in philosophical and scientific inquiry. This role consists of the use of the special form of

In: History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis

Aristotle’s Sophistical Refutations A Translation1 Pieter Sjoerd Hasper 1. Appearance and reality in argument and refutation Now we must discuss sophistical refutations, that is, arguments that appear to be 164a20 refutations, but are in fact fallacies rather than refutations. In accordance with

In: History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis

cutting by chance or accidentally. Galen De Capt. 594.6, 17–18 Abstract This paper discusses two issues that have challenged interpreters of Aristotle’s Sophistical Refutations (SE): (1) the criteria behind Aristotle’s classification of lin- guistic fallacies; (2) the interpretation of the opening passage

In: History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis
In: Fallacious Arguments in Ancient Philosophy
In: Fallacious Arguments in Ancient Philosophy
The central aim of this volume is to foster a new understanding of Aristotle’s Sophistical Refutations and thereby to enrich our knowledge of the beginnings of logical analysis. An important service for the scientific community to support this aim is the edition of a new translation of Aristotle’s work into English. The contributions discussing the original work were inspired by a onference in 2009 in Berlin which was the first one exclusively dedicated to Sophistical Refutations of Aristotle and brought together nearly everyone working on the main topics Aristotle deals with in that work. In Aristotle we see the onset of systematic theorizing about argumentation, including an account of the ways in which arguments, despite of being incorrect, may appear to be correct and of the relations between different types of argumentation (in science, in discussions with various purposes, in everyday life), but also of the connections with more general philosophical issues, like the meaning of words and the ontological status of universals. Fallacious Arguments in Ancient Philosophy It is, however, primarily because of its account of argumentation that Aristotle’s Sophistical Refutations, together with the Topics, has caught the attention of those working in the field of argumentation theory. This collection shows that the study of argumentation theory in Ancient Philosophy, and with Aristotle in particular, is in good shape. At least some of the points made in the articles brought together here will withstand scrutiny and will advance our understanding of the beginnings of logical analysis. The authors: Jonathan Adler (†), Susanne Bobzien, Robert Bolton, Luca Castagnoli, Louis-André Dorion, Paolo Fait, Adrian Frey, Pieter Sjoerd Hasper, Wolfgang Kienzler, Colin Guthrie King, Raina Kirchhoff, Ermelinda Valentina di Lascio, Yakir Levin, Christof Rapp, Carrie Swanson - the first translation of Aristotle’s Sophistical Refutations (transl. by P.S. Hasper)
Author: Paolo Fait

schoolmen invoked sophistical maxims when discussing Aristotle’s Sophistical Refutations is in the following passage taken from Duns Scotus’ commentary on that treatise:28 trans.). But, as Aristotle makes clear in the following lines, what is not performed by reason is accomplished by other cognitive

In: History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis

is the proper province of Aristotle’s De Sophisticis Elenchis , which provides an account of the mechanisms of eristic argument, and to which we must look for an account of the mechanisms involved in merely apparently acceptable premisses, or false Índoxa. It is general consensus that Aristotle’s

In: History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis

of the primitive items of the science in question. § 1 Introduction Aristotle’s Sophistical Refutations is about logical self-defence. It teaches the skills to protect oneself, primarily against dialectical interlocutors who may employ, whether on purpose or not, types of argument that are only

In: History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis
Author: Carrie Swanson

In the eighth chapter of De Sophisticis Elenchis, Aristotle introduces a mode of sophistical refutation that constitutes an addition to the taxonomy of the earlier chapters of the treatise. The new mode is pseudo-scientific refutation, or “the [syllogism or refutation] which though real, [merely] appears appropriate to the subject matter” (τòν ὂντα μέν φαινóμενoν δέ ỏιϰειoν ιoῦ πράγμαιoς, 169b22–3). Against the grain of its most commonly accepted reading, I argue that Aristotle is not concerned in SE 8 to establish that both the apparent refutations of SE 4–7 and pseudo-scientific refutations issue in false conclusions. His concern rather is to provide a causal analysis of both classes of apparent refutation alike which will explain why both kinds of apparent refutation are sophistical – and whose solutions are therefore the task of no special science but of a dialectical σλλογιστιϰή τέχνη (172a35). I conclude my analysis with the observation that Aristotle exploits the results of SE 8 to fend off inSE 9, 10, and 11 respectively a triad of threats to the very existence of a τέχνη of the resolution of sophistical refutation. The three threats are: the impossibility of omniscience; the relativity of semantic beliefs; and the incapacity of a questioner ignorant of a science to expose the ignorance of a pretender to scientific expertise.

In: History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis