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traditional connection between essence and the “What is x?” question through his famous singleton example. 2 Fine has shown compellingly that there is an intuitive sense of essence, according to which although the property of being a member of {Socrates} is necessary to Socrates, Socrates isn’t essentially a
From the Essence of Evidence to the Evidence of Essence A Critical Analysis of the Methodological Reduction of Evidence to Adequate Self-givenness in Husserl’s The Idea of Phenomenology George Heffernan, Merrimack College Abstract This paper poses a problem with respect to Husserl’s concept of
). Is the claim that adumbrational givenness is essential to spatiotemporal objects or that perception of those is essentially such that it is perspectival? Are we talking about the essence of spatiotemporal objects or the essence of perception of them? To decide on this question, it is important
From the Essence of Evidence to the Evidence of Essence A Critical Analysis of the Methodological Reduction of Evidence to Adequate Self-givenness in Husserl's The Idea 0/ Phenomenology George Heffeman, Merrimack College Abstract This paper poses a problem with respect to Husserl's concept
moral enhancements could eventually eliminate human freedom and thereby destroy the essence of humanity itself. 7. Bibliography Ach , J. ( 2018 ): “ Transhumanismus und Enhancement der Moral ,” in: Göcke , B. & Meier-Hamidi , F. (eds.), Designobjekt Mensch , Freiburg : Herder
Spinoza’s Substance Monism Yakir Levin, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev Abstract In Spinoza’s substance monism, radically different attributes constitute the essence of one and the same substance qua a strongly unified whole. Showing how this is possible poses a formidable Cartesian challenge to
essences or substantial forms (2015, 158). A possible conclusion could be that in the deepest metaphysical analysis the Leibniz of DM is committed to a Platonist view to the effect that an individual substance does not so much have , but is an individual, perfectly determinate essence, nature, or form
like ‘nature’ and ‘essence’, ‘reality’ (or ‘being’) and ‘truth’, about ‘powers’ and ‘faculties’ – and does not lead by itself to an object-level theory about spiritual things like the soul. We therefore cannot just replace critical metaphysics of the human mind by empirical investigation of human
This volume explores the history of the closely related concepts of form ( eidos, morphē ), kind ( genos ), and essence ( to ti ēn einai ). These concepts have been the subject of considerable recent research, in particular within metaphysics and philosophy of science. Yet much of the historical
reasons, the book is also accessible to students and could therefore be excellent study material for a course on scientic explanation and the Posterior Analytics.5 Bibliography Anscombe, G. E. M./Geach, P. T. 1961. Three Philosophers. Oxford: Blackwell. Charles, D. 2000. Aristotle on Meaning and Essence