I argue that Plato’s account of hunger and thirst in Republic IV, 437d–439a uncovers a general feature of desire: desire has an unqualified and a qualified dimension. This proposal, which I call Two Dimensions, captures recognizable motivational phenomena: being hungry and aiming to determine what one is hungry for, or wanting to study and still figuring out what field it is that one wants to study. Two Dimensions is a fundamental contribution to the theory of desire. It is compatible, I argue, with the better known premise that desire is for the good, because the objects of paradigmatic desires are inherently valuable.
THE CONTRIBUTORS / DIE AUTOREN Nicholas R. Baima Nathan Bauer Thomas C. Brickhouse Travis Butler Stefan Büttner Moritz Cordes Tsarina Doyle Terence Irwin Péter Lautner Nathan Rothschild Petter Sandstad Nicholas D. Smith Katja Maria Vogt Michael Wreen
In Posterior Analytics 2.19, Aristotle argues that we cannot have innate knowledge of first principles because if we did we would have the most precise items of knowledge without noticing, which is impossible. To understand Aristotle’s argument we need to understand why he thinks we cannot possess these items of knowledge without noticing. In this paper, I present three different answers to this question and three different readings of his argument corresponding to them. The first two readings focus on the fact that we do not use the knowledge we allegedly possess innately. However, I argue that these readings fail to produce convincing arguments. I then offer a third reading, which focuses on the fact that we do not notice the knowledge we allegedly possess innately when we use it for the first time (i. e., on Plato’s account, when we recollect). I argue that this reading produces a more convincing argument than either of the first two.
Scholars often assert that Plato and Aristotle share the view that discursive thought (dianoia) is internal speech (TIS). However, there has been little work to clarify or substantiate this reading. In this paper I show Plato and Aristotle share some core commitments about the relationship of thought and speech, but cash out TIS in different ways. Plato and Aristotle both hold that discursive thinking is a process that moves from a set of doxastic states to a final doxastic state. The resulting judgments (doxai) can be true or false. Norms govern these final judgments and, in virtue of that, they govern the process that arrives at those judgments. The principal norm is consistency. However, the philosophers differ on the source of this norm. For Plato, persuasiveness and accuracy ground non-contradiction because internal speech is dialogical. For Aristotle, the Principle of Non-Contradiction grounds a Doxastic Thesis (DT) that no judgment can contradict itself. For Aristotle, metaphysics grounds non-contradiction because internal speech is monological.
The focus of the paper is that for Plato all kinds of knowing, including sense perception, are acts of distinguishing something (krinein). Emotions and strivings are depending on acts of distinguishing and each part of the soul has a specific way of knowing, feeling and desiring. The thymoeides desires pleasures which arise from the judgement (doxa) of individual abilities and achievements (erga). It is related to the individual cases in which these abilities or achievements are preserved or destroyed. The close relationship between logistikon and thymoeides results from the fact that the thymoeides deals with the sphere of doxa. That’s why it is more open to rational argumentation than the epithymētikon, whose primary sphere is sense perception.
The thematic focus of this volume concerns a fruitful discussion between Analytic Philosophy and Classical German Philosophy focusing on ideas of Kant and Hegel and its relation to modern systematic philosophy. While the focus articles were handled by the guest editors, the additional articles were managed by the General editors. Among the latter articles, which were accepted on the basis of the regular call, there are discussions of the work of Parmenides, Plato and Thomas Aquinas. The Authors: Marcos G. Breuer, Paul Clavier, Jacopo Domenicucci, Jasper Doomen, Arthur Kok, Franz von Kutschera, Albert Newen, Julian Nida-Rümelin, Manish Oza, Peter Rohs, Birgit Sandkaulen, Federico Sanguinetti, Richard Schantz, Tobias Schlicht, Benjamin Schnieder, Oliver R. Scholz, Ludwig Siep, Achim Stephan, Pirmin Stekeler-Weithofer, Patrick Toner
Can a person be morally beautiful? Can a character trait, such as honesty, be beautiful and sneakiness ugly or disgusting? Or are such expressions merely metaphorical? Talk of moral beauty has been commonplace since antiquity; and especially 18th-century philosophers used the notion. Yet, a literal meaning quickly leads to Moral judgements based on mere physical appearance, as physiognomists such as Lavater have endorsed. This book assesses influential 18th-century theories of moral beauty and proposes two conditions for a safe literal conception of moral beauty that not only helps justify many moral judgements based on aesthetic Quality but also shows how beauty and moral virtue can be based on the same principles. First, we need an account of why moral beauty and non-moral physical beauty are distinct kinds of beauty; and second, we need an account of how moral beauty can be expressive of moral virtue without identifying the one with the other. The reasons why Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Hume, and Reid only meet the first condition and why Kant and Schiller meet both conditions are extremely illuminating for current debates on the interactions between aesthetics and moral theory.