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Modality and Causality in the First Part of Aquinas’s Third Way Charles J. Kelly, Le Moyne College In seiner Tertia Via behauptet Thomas von Aquin, dass einige Dinge, da sie entstehen und vergehen, möglicherweise existieren und möglicherweise nicht existieren. „Es ist aber“ fährt er fort

In: History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis
Author: Peter Rohs

enable an all-encompassing experience. Especially the category of causality and the causal principle connected to it are ascribed such a function. Only an experience that includes knowledge of laws and thus enables explanations may also be referred to as theoretical knowledge in the strict sense. Whether

In: Mind and the Present
Author: Paul Hoffman

Final Causation in Spinoza1 Paul Hoffman (†), University of California Riverside Abstract John Carriero has argued that for Spinoza there is no final causality in the Aris- totelian sense and that the striving of things is merely to be understood in terms of metaphysical inertia. This paper makes a

In: History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis
Author: Peter Rohs

-words, deterministic laws cannot contain such expressions. The will is not a particular cause, but only a dependent moment in the process. Causality of freedom should be dened by the logical structure of the involved laws. Actions can be explained, but only ex post. Als primäre Träger der Eigenschaft, frei zu sein

In: History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis
Author: Stephan Schmid

sake of specific ends, but every active substance (like animals and elements) does. It is this claim I reconstruct and discuss in this paper. I argue that it is based on Aquinas’ understanding of causality which is best – or so I suggest – conceived as a dispositional theory of causation. However

In: History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis

: Hackett. Bennett, J. 1990. Spinoza and Teleology: A Reply to Curley. In: Curley, E./Moreau, P.-F. (eds.). Spinoza: Issues and Directions. Leiden: Brill, 53–57. Carriero, J. 2005. Spinoza on Final Causality. In: Garber, D./Nadler, S. (eds.). Oxford Studies in Early Modern Philosophy, Vol. 2. Oxford: Oxford

In: History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis
Author: Daniel Dohrn

Hume. However, it seems questionable whether Hume really endorsed the (in)conceivability-(im)possibility link. I maintain that to Hume conceivability is a guide to metaphysical modalities (section 1). I address two opposite problems for this view, which arise from Hume’s reasoning about causality

In: History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis

Einstein, Note 1 above; also Louis de Broglie, Physics and Microphysics (New York: Harper & Row, 1960); Schrödinger, Letters on Wave Mechanics (op. cit.); David Bohm, Causality and Chance in Modern Physics (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1957); David Bohm and B.J. Hiley, The Undivided Universe : an

In: History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis
Author: Markus Wild

that beliefs have more X because of custom and habit . The effect of custom consists in the preservation of the repeated order and constant conjunction of the received perception-pairs in imagination. All of this supports the idea that Hume includes causality and custom in his definition of belief: A

In: History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis
Author: Marianne Schark

Form durch Aggregation von kleineren Einzeldingen, und das Produkt solcher Entstehungsprozesse sind Aggregate. Demgegenüber haben Organismen die Form von Systemen (vgl. KU, 30). 24 Vgl. Allison 1991, 28: „Mechanism in this sense encompasses any mode of causality that operates non-purposively.“ 138

In: History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis