Author: Boris Hennig

other kinds of matter. I will assess these options by asking how independent the matter and the form of a natural thing are from one another. If the matter of a thing is specifiable exclusively in terms of its function, it might turn out that all such matter really belongs to the form. Then, there

In: History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis
Author: Dorothea Frede

schizophrenic, he must have known what he was doing. But what, according to the interpretation proposed here, was he doing? 2 Forms as Functions: The Three Beds The more ‘down-to-earth’ view of Plato’s theory of Forms proposed here cannot be defended with reference to everything to which Plato

In: History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis
Author: Peter Rohs

move, but nothing within it can think or act. When speaking of inner processes, Kant usually does not refer to activity but to spontaneity. It is crucial that the specific constitution thesis also applies to spontaneity. Such processes cannot be represented through a function x(t) or understood as a

In: Mind and the Present
In: Methodisches Denken im Kontext
In: Von Rang und Namen
Knowledge and Meaning in Literature
The book addresses the questions how literature can convey knowledge and how literary meaning can arise in the face of the fact that fictional texts waive the usual claim to truth. Based on the interdisciplinary cooperation of literary scholars and analytic philosophers, the present anthology attempts a) to analyze the possibility and conditions of gaining know - ledge through literature, and b) to apply, in a fruitful way, philosophical theories of meaning and interpretation to the constitution of meaning within the language of literature. The project is guided by the hypothesis that the cognitive function of literature cannot be understood without such fundamental modelings of the complex interaction of meaning, truth and knowledge.
Author: Scarlet Siebert

a literature review describing the functions and characteristics of these roles. Didactic concepts explaining how learners acquire knowledge and skills under different instruction styles as well as concepts of developmental psychology explaining how children perceive social robots will serve as

In: Artificial Intelligence
Interdisciplinary Reflections
Editor: Jan G. Michel
Scientific progress depends crucially on scientific discoveries. Yet the topic of scientific discoveries has not been central to debate in the philosophy of science. This book aims to remedy this shortcoming. Based on a broad reading of the term “science” (similar to the German term “Wissenschaft ”), the book convenes experts from different disciplines who reflect upon several intertwined questions connected to the topic of making scientific discoveries.
Among these questions are the following: What are the preconditions for making scientific discoveries? What is it that we (have to) do when we make discoveries in science? What are the objects of scientific discoveries, how do we name them, and how do scientific names function? Do dis-coveries in, say, physics and biology, share an underlying structure, or do they differ from each other in crucial ways? Are other fields such as theology and environmental studies loci of scientific discovery? What is the purpose of making scientific discoveries? Explaining nature or reality? Increasing scientific knowledge? Finding new truths? If so, how can we account for instructive blunders and serendipities in science?
In the light of the above, the following is an encompassing question of the book: What does it mean to make a discovery in science, and how can scientific discoveries be distinguished from non-scientific discoveries?

to public liturgies. All in all, the practical theological interpretation of blessing shows that the existential dimension of the rite has scarcely been worked out here. There is also a lack of religious psychology studies that expose the functions of blessing and in this sense offer connection

In: Artificial Intelligence
Author: Marianne Schark

Is Kant’s solution to the problem of natural teleology still relevant? In the science of biology the notions of purposiveness and function continue to have a widespread use. This use appears problematic if one has to understand purposiveness and functions as mind-dependent, that is, as relational properties that an entity aquires only as a means in the context of the achievement of some end present in the mind of some intentional agent. The paper takes a close look at Kant’s argumentation for why we are obliged to think teleologically about organisms and at his non-naturalistic solution of the problem of natural teleology. Finally the power of Kant’s solution is discussed in comparison to the two main contemporary naturalistic analyses of the notion of function in the philosophy of biology, namely the etiological theory and the causal role-account of functions.

In der Biologie wird der Begriff der Funktion nach wie vor vielfältig eingesetzt, und auch Fragen nach der Zweckmäßigkeit eines Prozesses oder Körperbestandteils spielen eine Rolle. Die Verwendung dieser Konzepte mit Bezug auf die Gegenstände der Biologie erscheint indes problematisch, wenn Zweckmäßigkeit und Funktionen als geistabhängig aufgefaßt werden müssen, d.h. als relationale Eigenschaften, die ein Gegenstand nur in dem Kontext erwirbt, daß er als ein Mittel zur Erreichung eines Ziels eingesetzt wird, welches im Geist eines intrinsisch intentionalen Akteurs präsent ist. Der Beitrag untersucht detailliert, wie Kant dafür argumentiert, daß wir gezwungen sind, über Organismen teleologisch zu denken, und wie er das Problem der Naturteleologie auf nicht-naturalistische Weise auflöst. Anschließend wird die Leistungsfähigkeit seiner Lösung im Vergleich mit den der beiden dominierenden naturalistischen Analysen des Funktionsbegriffs in der zeitgenössischen Wissenschaftstheorie der Biologie diskutiert, nämlich der ätiologischen Theorie der Funktion und der Analyse von Funktionen als kausalen Rollen.

In: History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis