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Author: Marcel Buß

the self-defeating nature of certain sceptical positions, one might suspect that they are indirect arguments. An indirect argument for a thesis T does not provide reasons for T right away. Instead, it starts by arguing against the contradictory opposite of what we want to show, namely ¬ T . Once

In: History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis

(including a fresh look at the debate about condi- tional analyses of dispositions), and how they can account for the laws of nature (ch. 2–3). He then provides indirect argument for dispositional essentialism: first, by rejecting the rival view of categoricalism (ch. 4); second, by dispelling objections to

In: History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis

(including a fresh look at the debate about condi- tional analyses of dispositions), and how they can account for the laws of nature (ch. 2–3). He then provides indirect argument for dispositional essentialism: first, by rejecting the rival view of categoricalism (ch. 4); second, by dispelling objections to

In: Focus: Ancient and Medieval Philosophy/Schwerpunkt: Antike und Mittelalterliche Philosophie
Author: Barbara Vetter

debate about condi- tional analyses of dispositions), and how they can account for the laws of nature (ch. 2–3). He then provides indirect argument for dispositional essentialism: first, by rejecting the rival view of categoricalism (ch. 4); second, by dispelling objections to dispositional essentialism

In: History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis
Author: Barbara Vetter

debate about condi- tional analyses of dispositions), and how they can account for the laws of nature (ch. 2–3). He then provides indirect argument for dispositional essentialism: first, by rejecting the rival view of categoricalism (ch. 4); second, by dispelling objections to dispositional essentialism

In: Focus: Ancient and Medieval Philosophy/Schwerpunkt: Antike und Mittelalterliche Philosophie
Author: Thomas Krogh

developing a nonpresentist type of A-theory, I therefore hope to contribute to a general strengthening of the A-theory. But my claim does not go beyond proposing that by establishing the best possible version of the A-theory, I present an indirect argument against the B-theory. However, some philosophers

In: Kant: Here, Now and How
Author: Robert Bolton

met for the premises. There is, of course, one type, but only one type, of peirastic refutation which can employ a false premise, namely a refutation by indirect argument in a reductio. In that case the ignorant pretender’s false claim is taken as one premise of the argument and from it and the other

In: History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis
Author: Martin Pleitz

plausible that the objects of these attitudes are none other than the primary truth bearers. Thus the phenomenon of hyperintensionality provides us with an indirect argument to prefer semantic sentences to propositions as the primary truth bearers.937 To sum up. We should reject the view that syntactic

In: Logic, Language, and the Liar Paradox
Author: Robert Bolton

is, of course, one type, but only one type, of peirastic refutation which can employ a false premise, namely a refutation by indirect argument in a reductio. In that case the ignorant pretender's false claim is taken as one premise of the argument and from it and the other premises (which must be

In: Fallacious Arguments in Ancient Philosophy

developed which unites those insights. If this can be shown convincingly, then a further and more indirect argument in favor of the view of genuinely active animals is available: the view helps solving, or dissolving, one of the most puzzling problems of philosophy. - To simpHfy exposition, the view that

In: Von Rang und Namen