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“Limitless” and “Limit” in Xenophanes’ Cosmology and in His Doctrine of Epistemic “Construction” (dokos) Alexander P. D. Mourelatos According to both the ancient tradition and many (perhaps the majority) of modern inter- preters, Xenophanes B34 represents a statement of some form of skepticism. Let

In: History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis
Author: Peter Singer

Freedom of speech has traditionally been a cause championed by the left and liberal side of the political spectrum, against conservatives who have tried to limit the expression of radical ideas. Here are three examples from the United States: When I was appointed to Princeton University in

In: Analytische Explikationen & Interventionen
Author: Boris Fehse

with the disposal of embryos. Therefore, it could not be excluded that the (yet hypothetical) error-free gene therapeutic correction of germ-line cells might be acceptable for people strictly disapproving PGD. Genetie Modifications - Possibilities and Limits of Gene Therapy 115 Darwin' s theory was

In: Human Nature and Self Design

"Limitless" and "Limit" in Xenophanes' Cosmology and in His Doctrine of Epistemic "Construction" (dokos) Alexander P. D. Mourelatos According to both the ancient tradition and many (perhaps the majority) of modem inter- preters, Xenophanes B34 represents a statement of some form of skepticism

In: Ancient Epistemology

Quantum Mechanics and the Limits of Empiricism: Recent Challenges to the Orthodox Theory Christopher Norris, Cardiff University I The measurement-problem in quantum mechanics first cropped up in the 1930s during a famous series of debates between Einstein and Bohr concerning the physical adequacy

In: History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis

life forms with other human Iife forms in history (p. 32). Differing from other books of Plessner (Limits of Communi~v (1924); Power and Human Nature (1931); Tbe BelatedNation (1935), Laughing and Crying (1941); Anthropology of Senses (1970); Conditio humana (1964», his book Levels of the Organic

In: Human Nature and Self Design
Author: Burt C. Hopkins

and the critical limits of what Kant calls the ‘qualitative’ unity of transcendental consciousness. These critical limits are exposed in both philosophers’ attempts to account for that ‘qualitative’ unity on the basis of the ‘quantitative’ unity of number. Introduction Mathematical Background of the

In: History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis
Perspectives on Nonpropositionality
The concept of nonpropositionality covers the vast field of those aspects of knowledge and experience that cannot be captured by a truth-functional approach or escape conceptual analysis. The book is confined to questions of theoretical philosophy. Its first part provides an orientation within the nonpropositional jungle by critically following a historically beaten track: the philosophy of Gottlob Frege. It not only explains the propositional focus of Frege’s epistemology, logic and philosophy of language against the historical background of psychologism but focuses on the limits of this propositional approach. The critical analysis of Frege’s logicist project centres on its foundational basis: definitions, logically primitive terms, elucidations of these terms as well as aspects of what Frege calls ‚colouring‘. The second part of the book echoes many of the central elements which mark the limits of Frege’s propositional conception by dealing with the systematically pivotal role that the concept of nonpropositionality plays in contemporary analytical philosophy, especially within epistemology and philosophy of mind. Two main areas stand out: theories of perception and the discussion of inner experience. The focus here is on non-epistemic conceptions of seeing, the non-conceptual content of experience as well as on phenomenal consciousness and self-consciousness. The pivotal claim is that the nonpropositional constitutes the basis of and a necessary condition for the propositional. Any attempt to embark on an analysis of the propositional and of propositional knowledge will float in the air unless the nonpropositional grounds are systematically secured. The book aims to close this gap.
Author: Sven Rosenkranz
The Agnostic Stance is a sustained defence of agnosticism as a serious alternative to both metaphysical realism and anti-realism. Metaphysical realists and anti-realists give competing answers to the question of whether truth and reality transcend what we can know or think. The agnostic, by contrast, denies that we are in a position to know how to answer this question. First it is shown how this epistemic reservation can be understood to involve more than merely a temporary suspension of judgement, without thereby collapsing into a form of scepticism inconsistent with the possibility of future knowledge. Then it is argued in detail that agnosticism, as thus understood, fares much better than its realist and anti-realist competitors when it comes to the question about the limits of our thought and knowledge. In pursuing this aim, The Agnostic Stance covers a wide range of topics in general epistemology, the metaphysics of mind and the philosophy of logic and Language.
The Role of Transparency in First Personal Knowledge
Self-knowledge and self-deception present fundamental problems and puzzles to philosophy of mind. In this book accounts of both phenomena are systematically developed and defended against classical and recent views. The proposed 'cognitive ascent model' offers an explanation of the intuitive peculiarity of self-knowledge as well as of the reach and limits of our epistemic privilege. The model builds on a general transparency principle for attitudes. Transparency can be the key to a genuinely first-personal knowledge of attitudes to the extent that someone’s having a certain attitude is to be identified with his attributing a value property to an intentional object. The offered view rejects the strategies of inner sense, parallelism and constitutivism. Paradigmatic self-deception, rather than being a failure of recognizing one’s own mental states is a failure at the level of metacognitive control over belief-formation. Self-deceptive beliefs are formed or maintained against criterial evidence via pseudo-rational adaptations in belief-systems.