AutorIn: Sara L. Uckelman

medieval logic, January 2007, and those of the Square of Opposition International Congress, June 2007, for stimulating and helpful discussion on earlier versions of this paper, and also the useful suggestions of the two anonymous referees.

in History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis

Using a short excerpt from Anselm’s Responsio as an example, this paper tries to present logical reconstruction as a special type of exegetical interpretation by paraphrase that is subject to (adapted) hermeneutic maxims and presumption rules that govern exegetical interpretation in general. As such, logical reconstruction will be distinguished from the non-interpretative enterprise of formalization and from the development of theories of logical form, which provide a framework in which formalization and reconstruction take place. Yet, even though logical reconstruction is dependent on methods of formalization, it allows us to use formal methods for the analysis and assessment of natural language texts that are not readily formalizable and is thus an important tool when it comes to applying the concepts and methods of formal logic to such texts.

in History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis
in History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis
Free Logic is an important field of philosophical logic. It appeared first in the 1950s, and Karel Lambert was one of its founders and coined the term. The volume begins with three of Lambert’s most recent essays. These papers are followed by a dialogue between Karel Lambert and Edgar Morscher on free logic. The second part of the volume contains papers by Peter Simons and Edgar Morscher on free logic. A systematic and historical survey of free logic with an annotated bibliography of works on free logic completes the book.
in History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis
The Liar paradox arises when we consider a sentence that says of itself that it is not true. If such self-referential sentences exist – and examples like »This sentence is not true« certainly suggest this –, then our logic and standard notion of truth allow to infer a contradiction: The Liar sentence is true and not true. What has gone wrong? Must we revise our notion of truth and our logic? Or can we dispel the common conviction that there are such self-referential sentences? The present study explores the second path. After comparing the Liar reasoning in formal and informal logic and showing that there are no Gödelian Liar sentences, the study moves on from the semantics of self-reference to the metaphysics of expressions and proposes a novel solution to the Liar paradox: Meaningful expressions are distinct from their syntactic bases and exist only relative to contexts. Detailed semantico-metaphysical arguments show that in this dynamic setting, an object can be referred to only after it has started to exist. Hence the circular reference needed in the Liar paradox cannot occur, after all. As this solution is contextualist, it evades the expressibility problems of other proposals.
The Sorites Paradox and the Nature and Logic of Vague Language
This book reassesses philosophical approaches to linguistic vagueness, a puzzling feature of natural language that gives rise to the ancient Sorites paradox.
The paradox consists in three claims: (1) One grain of sand does not make a heap. (2) One billion grains of sand do make a heap. (3) For any two amounts of sand differing by at most one grain: either both are heaps of sand, or neither one is.
Claim (3) is rendered plausible by an initial conviction that vague predicates like ‘heap’ tolerate small changes. The repeated application of a tolerance principle to claim (2), however, yields the further proposition that one grain of sand does make a heap – which contradicts claim number one. Consequently, many philosophers reject or modify tolerance principles for vague predicates.
Inga Bones reassesses prominent responses to the Sorites and defends a Wittgensteinian dissolution of the paradox. She argues that vague predicates are, indeed, tolerant and discusses how this finding relates to the paradox itself, to the notion of validity and to the concept of a borderline case.
Essays zu Ehren von Christian Thiel
2017 beging der Philosoph und Wissenschaftshistoriker Christian Thiel seinen 80. Geburtstag, der seit mehr als einem halben Jahrhundert im Besonderen die internationale Fregeforschung maßgeblich mitgestaltet hat.
Zu seinen Ehren veranstalteten Freunde, Weggefährten und Schüler ein wissenschaftliches Kolloquium, das aus der Vielfalt an Fregeschen Themen schöpfte. Dieser Band vereint die Essays, die aus diesem Anlass verfasst wurden.
AutorIn: Nicole Rathgeb

logic of any expression of ordinary language; for ordinary language has no exact logic.« 12 Für die Vertreterinnen und Vertreter der OLP ist es typisch, stückweise vorzugehen: Statt Wissen, Wahrheit oder Wahrnehmung im Allgemeinen in den Blick zu nehmen, werden zunächst einmal einzelne Fälle von

in Die Begriffsanalyse im 21. Jahrhundert
AutorIn: Nicole Rathgeb

keine substanziellen Wahrheiten über die Welt erkennen kann: [W]e should be open to the idea that thinking just as much as perceiving is a way of learning how things are. Even if one does not fully understand how thinking can provide new knowledge, the cases of logic and mathematics constitute

in Die Begriffsanalyse im 21. Jahrhundert