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Author: Guy Schuh

earlier set down as a merely preliminary view. The second reason that a general treatment of Aristotle’s exploratory investigative strategy in the NE is desirable is that his use of this investigative strategy sheds some light on his pedagogical and methodological commitments. It is the result of a

In: History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis
Author: Scott Aikin

together make the paradox and the case for what I will call progressor’s double-vision . They are: (i) The methodological priority argument (ii) The valuational priority argument (iii) The progressor’s argument I will argue that E 52’s core argument is that because we must master

In: History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis
In: Wayfinding
In: Intentional Horizons
An Enquiriy Concerning Economic Modelling
Author: Simon Deichsel
Deichsel attempts to justify a normative role for methodology by sketching a pragmatic way out of the dichotomy between two major strands in economic methodology: empiricism and postmodernism. It is important to understand that this book is about methodology and this means that it does not add another recipe with prescriptions as to how economics needs to change in order to become a 'better' or 'proper' science. Instead, several methodological approaches are discussed and assessed concerning their aptness for theory appraisal in economics. The book starts with presenting the most common views on methodology (i.e. empiricism and postmodernism) and provides reasons why they are each ill-suited for giving methodological prescriptions to economics. Finally, a pragmatic approach that can do this is sketched out.
Series Editors: Uwe Meixner and Albert Newen
From 2020 on, Philosophiegeschichte und logische Analyse / Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy will be continued as the biannual journal History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis. The thematic and methodological aims will remain the same.
In: The Usefulness of Truth
In: The A Priori and Its Role in Philosophy
Author: Justin Vlasits

plausibility of this dogmatist response seems to directly hinge on whether they can say what “the right way” is, that is, if they can give us a methodology, an account of the correct method of inquiry, which is able to say that dogmatists end up at their dogmata by inquiring in the right way while skeptics

In: History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis