earlier set down as a merely preliminary view. The second reason that a general treatment of Aristotle’s exploratory investigative strategy in the NE is desirable is that his use of this investigative strategy sheds some light on his pedagogical and methodological commitments. It is the result of a
Aristotle’s notion of experience (in the sense involved in being an experienced person) occupies an important place in his account of scientific understanding and its methodology. It is linked, not only to sense-perception and the principles of skill and scientific understanding, but also, methodologically, to ἐπαγωγή. Due to its various involvements it has a complex job to perform. Such a complexity – or Janus-face – gives rise to many questions concerning its status and content. Many of these questions were raised in later antiquity. In the introductory part of the paper I shall give a very brief summary of Aristotle’s notion of experience, concentrating on issues that will be relevant next, and then discuss the explanation we find in a commentary which has come down to us under the name of Philoponus. I do it in the hope that the discussion sheds light on novelties in the commentator’s approach which deserve attention.
together make the paradox and the case for what I will call progressor’s double-vision . They are:
(i) The methodological priority argument
(ii) The valuational priority argument
(iii) The progressor’s argument
I will argue that E 52’s core argument is that because we must master
Deichsel attempts to justify a normative role for methodology by sketching a pragmatic way out of the dichotomy between two major strands in economic methodology: empiricism and postmodernism. It is important to understand that this book is about methodology and this means that it does not add another recipe with prescriptions as to how economics needs to change in order to become a 'better' or 'proper' science. Instead, several methodological approaches are discussed and assessed concerning their aptness for theory appraisal in economics. The book starts with presenting the most common views on methodology (i.e. empiricism and postmodernism) and provides reasons why they are each ill-suited for giving methodological prescriptions to economics. Finally, a pragmatic approach that can do this is sketched out.
From 2020 on,
Philosophiegeschichte und logische Analyse / Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy will be continued as the biannual journal
History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis. The thematic and methodological aims will remain the same.