Collingwood’s An Essay on Philosophical Method provides an insightful critique of Russell’s analysis and metaphysics of logical atomism, proposing an unduly neglected neo - idealist alternative to Russell’s philosophical method. I summarize Collingwood’s critique of analysis and sympathetically outline the philosophical methodology of Collingwood’s post - Hegelian dialectical method: his scale of forms methodology, grounded on the overlap of philosophical classes. I then delineate Collingwood’s critique of the metaphysics of logical atomism, demonstrating how the scale of forms methodology is opposed to Russell’s logical atomism. Finally, I reflect on the reasons Collingwood’s Essay aroused little interest upon publication and the importance of continually rethinking the history of philosophy.
Aikin (forthcoming) for the case that fixing criteria is central to ancient philosophicalmethod (and for Hellenistic programs in particular). Sextus Empiricus’s primary critical strategy with Stoicism is posited on the primacy of logic for the school, and so targets it as his primary object of
motivate us to think more carefully about the sophistic roots of this philosophicalmethod employed by Plato and Socrates, that is Plato’s persistent allusions to Gorgias in the Parmenides . I will then lay out what I take to be the important similarities and differences between the philosophicalmethod
Logical reconstruction is a fundamental philosophical method for achieving clarity concerning the prerequisites, presuppositions and the logical structure of natural language arguments. The scope and limits of this method have become visible not least through its intense application to Anselm of Canterbury’s notorious proofs for the existence of God. This volume collects, on the one hand, reconstructions of Anselmian arguments that take account of the problems of reconstruction and, on the other hand, theoretical reflections on reconstruction with a view to Anselm. We hope that this will allow the reader to critically assess the merits of the theoretical The journal provides a forum for articles in which classical philosophical texts are interpreted by drawing on the resources on modern formal logic. All contributions are double blind peer-reviewed. Information concerning the contents of past volumes (abstracts of all published papers) and plans for future volumes (call for papers, etc.) can be found on the website: www.rub.de/philosophy/pla
The nature of intuitions remains a contested issue in (meta-)philosophy. Yet, intuitions are frequently cited in philosophical work, featuring most prominently in conceptual analysis, the philosophical method par excellence. In this paper, we approach the question about the nature of intuitions based on a pragmatist, namely, Wittgensteinian account of concepts. To Wittgenstein, intuitions are just immediate ‘ reactions ’ to certain cognitive tasks. His view provides a distinct alternative to identifying intuitions with either doxastic states or quasi-perceptual experiences. We discuss its implications for intuitions’ role in conceptual analysis and show that a Wittgensteinian account of intuitions is compatible even with ambitious metaphysical projects traditionally associated with this method.
distinguish between various philosophicalmethods, methods, that is, of arriving at (or trying to arrive at) the truth (or whatever does service for it). In this general sense, we moderns are accustomed to contrast analytical with continental, or hermeneutical, and perhaps even historical, approaches to
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Hartshorne , Ch. ( 1970 ). Creative Synthesis and PhilosophicMethod . La
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Hartshorne , C. ( 1970 ) Creative Synthesis and PhilosophicMethod . London : SCM Press .
Hartshorne , C. ( 1984 ) Omnipotence and Other Theological Mistakes . Albany, N.Y. : State University of New York .
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