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Author: Bernd Mahr

kapitel 4 On Judgements and Propositions a, 1 Abstract. This article studies some of the relevant and historically influen- tial conceptions of the notions of ›judgement‹ and ›proposition‹ and dis- cusses the relationship of these notions in these conceptions. In some detail the conceptions of

In: Schriften zur Modellforschung
Author: Albert Newen

4 Perry on Propositional Attitude Reports ALBERT NEWEN 1 The Phenomenon On the basis of a person' s utterance or explicit acceptance of an utterance or explicit acceptance of an utterance we often ascribe beliefs, desires, hopes, or other propositional attitudes. A propositional attitude

In: Identity, Language, and Mind
Author: Marko Malink

Indeterminate Propositions in Prior Analytics I.41 Marko Malink, Humboldt-Universität Berlin In Analytica Priora I.41 stellt Aristoteles eine bemerkenswerte Behauptung über unbestimmte Aussagen wie ‚A kommt B zu‘ auf. Die Behauptung impliziert, dass solche unbestimmten Aussagen nicht gleichwertig

In: Focus: Ancient and Medieval Philosophy/Schwerpunkt: Antike und Mittelalterliche Philosophie
Author: Marko Malink

Indeterminate Propositions in Prior Analytics I.41 Marko Malink, Humboldt-Universität Berlin In Analytica Priora I.41 stellt Aristoteles eine bemerkenswerte Behauptung über unbestimmte Aussagen wie ‚A kommt B zu‘ auf. Die Behauptung impliziert, dass solche unbestimmten Aussagen nicht gleichwertig

In: History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis

Existence and Propositional Attitudes: A Fregean Analysis* Leila Haaparanta, University of Tampere 1. Introduction Tyler Burge argued in his paper ‘Belief de re ’ (1977) that de re beliefs, which place the believer in a relation to objects, are more fundamental than de dicto beliefs. He assumed

In: History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis
Perspectives on Nonpropositionality
The concept of nonpropositionality covers the vast field of those aspects of knowledge and experience that cannot be captured by a truth-functional approach or escape conceptual analysis. The book is confined to questions of theoretical philosophy. Its first part provides an orientation within the nonpropositional jungle by critically following a historically beaten track: the philosophy of Gottlob Frege. It not only explains the propositional focus of Frege’s epistemology, logic and philosophy of language against the historical background of psychologism but focuses on the limits of this propositional approach. The critical analysis of Frege’s logicist project centres on its foundational basis: definitions, logically primitive terms, elucidations of these terms as well as aspects of what Frege calls ‚colouring‘. The second part of the book echoes many of the central elements which mark the limits of Frege’s propositional conception by dealing with the systematically pivotal role that the concept of nonpropositionality plays in contemporary analytical philosophy, especially within epistemology and philosophy of mind. Two main areas stand out: theories of perception and the discussion of inner experience. The focus here is on non-epistemic conceptions of seeing, the non-conceptual content of experience as well as on phenomenal consciousness and self-consciousness. The pivotal claim is that the nonpropositional constitutes the basis of and a necessary condition for the propositional. Any attempt to embark on an analysis of the propositional and of propositional knowledge will float in the air unless the nonpropositional grounds are systematically secured. The book aims to close this gap.

scientists to the test, work, and how do they differ from genuine scientific arguments? A peirastic argument succeeds in unmasking a would-be scientist if it establishes an inconsistency among the answers given. These answers may only comprise: propositions which are proper to the field and which everybody

In: History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis
Author: Antonia Barke
This book investigates whether knowledge is closed under known entailment. Traditionally it has been assumed that if a person knows some proposition p and also knows that this proposition entails another proposition q, then by inferring q from p that person would gain knowledge of q. This so-called ‚Principle of Deductive Closure‘ is of intrinsic interest because, if true, it expresses an important structural characteristic of knowledge. Challenges to this principle of deductive closure have been formulated by Fred Dretske and Robert Nozick, among others. Most replies to these challenges, as well as the challenges themselves, make explicit or implicit use of the idea that our knowledge claims are not invariant, but relative to a context. Therefore, a substantial part of the book is devoted to an analysis of contextualism and a criticism of the current contextualistic accounts. Once developed, the account is then used to answer the challenge to the principle of deductive closure. Epistemic contextualism results in a limited closure principle.
Author: Benjamin Wilck

regarding any given dogmatic proposition by constructing pairs of equally convincing arguments, or considerations, in favour of and against that dogmatic proposition. In his six books of Against the Professors ( Adversus Mathematicos , = M) , though, Sextus nonetheless presents a series of

Open Access
In: History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis