it were, serve as a support on which he could take a stand, to which he could apply his powers, and so set his understanding in motion. It is indeed the common fate of human reason to complete its speculative structures as speedily as may be, and only afterwards to enquire whether the foundations are
'Seeing Objects' provides a novel neurophilosophical theory of the structure and nature of visual object representation, and of mental representation in general. The book compares psychological and neurophysiological accounts on how our visual system creates coherent representations of objects with philosophical accounts of the structure of higher-level cognition. By integrating accounts of visual binding operations with philosophical theories of mental representation, 'Seeing Objects' provides a sustained empirical argument that the visual system, like higher-cognitive systems, is systematic and deploys non-conceptual representations with a compositional structure. Moreover, by considering the structural similarities between visual and thought representations, the book establishes a new theoretical basis for studies into the nature of the relation and interaction between perception and higher-order cognition, a timely research topic in Cognitive Science.
Eleatics. While others have noticed some of these connections, most have had little to say about why Plato goes out of his way to include them.
I will argue that the method thematized throughout the Parmenides , a method that I will call ‘exploring both sides’, uses the very same structure that Gorgias
This paper approaches the intentional structure of the emotions by considering three claims about that structure. The paper departs from the Brentanian and Husserlian ‘priority of presentation claim’ (PPC). The PPC comprises two theses: (1) intentional feelings and emotions are founded on presenting acts and (2) intentional feelings and emotions are directed specifically to the value-attributes of the presented objects. The paper then considers two challenges to this claim: the equiprimordial claim (EC) and the priority of feeling claim (PFC). The EC asserts that the presentational and affective dimensions of intentional feelings and emotions are equiprimordial. I respond to this challenge to the PPC by revising it, claiming instead that the founding relations exist between the presentational and affective senses (rather than the acts) in an experience whose presenting and affective aspects are equiprimordial. The PFC grants priority to the affective, a grant which presupposes the independence of the affective from the presentational. I argue that the PFC is mistaken, and that the revision of the PPC can handle the examples on which the PFC is based.
Edmund Husserl’s account of the horizonal character of simple, sensuous perception provides a sophisticated account of perceptual intentional content which enables plausible responses to key issues in the philosophy of perception and in Heidegger interpretation. Section 2 outlines Husserl’s account of intentionality in its application to such perceptual experience. Section 3 then elaborates the notion of perceptual horizon in order to draw out, in Section 4, its implications for four issues: firstly, the relation between the object perceived and perceptual appearance (qua item “in consciousness”); secondly, the relation between the subject perceiving and perceptual appearance; thirdly, what sense of the body is inherent to perceptual experience of the horizonal kind; and fourthly, what John McDowell is getting at when he claims that traditional conceptions fail to capture how perception puts us in cognitive contact with the world. The paper concludes by using the interpretation developed to show how Husserl’s account of perceptual experience as horizonal enables one to draw out the sense and worth of what Heidegger means by worldliness and the “Da” of Dasein.