Is Perception Essentially Perspectival?
Modality in Husserlian Phenomenology
In: History of Philosophy & Logical AnalysisAbstract
Husserl famously argues that it is essential to perception to present the perceived object in perspectives. Hence, there is no – and there cannot be – perception without perspectival givenness. Yet, it seems that there are counterexamples to this essentialist claim, for we seem to be able to imagine beings that do not perceive in perspectives. Recently, there have been some accounts in the literature that critically discuss those counterexamples and assess to what extent they succeed in challenging Husserl’s essentialist claim. In this paper I discuss three different answers to these counterexamples, all of them are found wanting. I offer a novel solution, taking into account some crucial findings of the contemporary debate about imagination and modality. I argue that this new solution is capable of fully vindicating Husserl’s essentialist claim. Finally, I reconstruct Husserl’s own way to treat such counterexamples, in order to showcase the notion of modality Husserlian phenomenology relies on. I argue for the hitherto widely underappreciated point that Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology cannot appeal to strictly absolute modality but that the kind of modality in Husserlian phenomenology is conditional on the facticity that we have the transcendental structure we do in fact have.
Purchase
Buy instant access (PDF download and unlimited online access):
Institutional Login
Log in with Open Athens, Shibboleth, or your institutional credentials
Personal login
Log in with your brill.com account
-
Husserl, E. Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität. Texte aus dem Nachlass. Zweiter Teil: 1921–1928, Husserliana 14. Kern, I. (ed.), 1973. Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff.
-
Husserl, E. Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy. First Book: General Introduction to a Pure Phenomneology. Kersten, F. (tr.), 1983. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. (= Ideas I)
-
Husserl, E. Logische Untersuchungen. Ergänzungsband – Erster Teil: Entwürfe zur Umarbeitung der VI. Untersuchung und zur Vorrede für die Neuauflage der Logischen Untersuchungen (Sommer 1913), Husserliana 20. Ullrich, M. (ed.), 2002. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
-
Husserl, E. Transzendentaler Idealismus. Texte aus dem Nachlass (1908–1921), Husserliana 36. Rollinger, R. D. & Sowa, R. (eds.), 2003. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
-
Berto, F. & Schoonen, T. 2018. Conceivability and Possibility: Some Dilemmas for Humeans. Synthese 195, 2697–2715.
-
Gregory, D. 2010. Conceivability and Apparent Possibility. In: Hale, B. & Hoffman, A. (eds.), Modality. Metaphysics, Logic, and Epistemology. Oxford. Oxford University Press, 319–341.
-
Hardy, L. 2013. Nature’s Suit. Husserl’s Phenomeological Philosphy of the Physical Sciences. Athens: Ohio University Press.
-
Held, K. 1966. Lebendige Gegenwart. Die Frage nach der Seinsweise des transzendentalen Ich bei Edmund Husserl, entwickelt am Leitfaden der Zeitproblematik. The Hague: Springer.
-
Jansen, J. 2005. On the Development of Husserl’s Transcendental Phenomenology of Imagination and its Use for Interdisciplinary Research. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4, 121–132.
-
Kern, I. 1973. Einleitung des Herausgebers. In: Husserl, E., Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität. Texte aus dem Nachlass. Dritter Teil: 1929–1935, Husserliana 15. Kern, I. (ed.), 1973. Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, xv – lxx.
-
Kern, I. 2019. Husserl’s Phenomenology of Intersubjectivity. In: Kjosavik, F., Beyer, C. & Fricke, C. (eds.), Husserl’s Phenomenology of Intersubjectivity. Historical Interpretations and Contemporary Applications. New York: Routledge, 11–90.
-
Kim, S. 1976. The Problem of the Contingency of the World in Husserl’s Phenomenology. Amsterdam: B. R. Grüner Publishing Company.
-
Kung, P. 2010. Imagination as a Guide to Possibility. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81(3), 620–663.
-
Madary, M. 2017. Visual Phenomenology. Cambridge, M.A. MIT Press.
-
Martin, W. M. 2005. Husserl and the Logic of Consciousness. In: Smith, D. W. & Thomasson, A. L. (eds.), Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 214–221.
-
Mohanty, J. N. 1984. Husserl on ‘Possibility’. Husserl Studies 1(1), 13–29.
-
Smith, D. W. 2007. Husserl. London: Routledge.
-
Soffer, G. 1991. Husserl and the Question of Relativism. Dordrecht: Springer.
-
Tengelyi, L. 2014. Welt und Unendlichkeit. Zum Problem phänomenologischer Metaphysik. Freiburg, München: Verlag Karl Alber.
-
Vaidya, A. J. & Wallner, M. 2021. The Epistemology of Modality and the Problem of Modal Epistemic Friction. Synthese 198, 1909–1935.
-
Vendler, Z. 1984. The Matter of Minds. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
-
Wallner, M. 2014. Phenomenological Actualism. A Husserlian Metaphysics of Modality? In: Rinofner-Kreidl, S. & Wiltsche, H. A. (eds.), Analytical and Continental Philosophy: Methods and Perspectives. Papers of the 37th International Wittgenstein Symposium. Kirchberg a. Wechsel: Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society, 283–285.
-
Wiltsche, H. A. 2013. How Essential are Essential Laws? A Thought Experiment on Physical Things and their Givenness in Adumbrations. In: Mertens, K. & Günzler, I. (eds.), Wahrnehmen, Fühlen, Handeln. Phänomenologie im Widerstreit der Methoden. Paderborn: Mentis, 421–436.
-
Zahavi, D. 2010. Husserl and the ‘Absolute’. In: Ierna, C., Jacobs, H. & Mattens, F. (eds.), Philosophy, Phenomenology, Sciences. Essays in Commemoration of Edmund Husserl. Dordrecht: Springer, 71–92.
-
Zahavi, D. 2017. Husserl’s Legacy. Phenomenology, Metaphysics, and Transcendental Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
-
Zhok, A. 2016. Possibility and Consciousness in Husserl’s Thought. Husserl Studies, 32(3), 213–235.
| All Time | Past Year | Past 30 Days | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Abstract Views | 195 | 195 | 11 |
| Full Text Views | 3 | 3 | 0 |
| PDF Views & Downloads | 12 | 12 | 0 |
Is Perception Essentially Perspectival?
Modality in Husserlian Phenomenology
In: History of Philosophy & Logical AnalysisAbstract
Husserl famously argues that it is essential to perception to present the perceived object in perspectives. Hence, there is no – and there cannot be – perception without perspectival givenness. Yet, it seems that there are counterexamples to this essentialist claim, for we seem to be able to imagine beings that do not perceive in perspectives. Recently, there have been some accounts in the literature that critically discuss those counterexamples and assess to what extent they succeed in challenging Husserl’s essentialist claim. In this paper I discuss three different answers to these counterexamples, all of them are found wanting. I offer a novel solution, taking into account some crucial findings of the contemporary debate about imagination and modality. I argue that this new solution is capable of fully vindicating Husserl’s essentialist claim. Finally, I reconstruct Husserl’s own way to treat such counterexamples, in order to showcase the notion of modality Husserlian phenomenology relies on. I argue for the hitherto widely underappreciated point that Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology cannot appeal to strictly absolute modality but that the kind of modality in Husserlian phenomenology is conditional on the facticity that we have the transcendental structure we do in fact have.
| All Time | Past Year | Past 30 Days | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Abstract Views | 195 | 195 | 11 |
| Full Text Views | 3 | 3 | 0 |
| PDF Views & Downloads | 12 | 12 | 0 |